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PAYING FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION*
RUSSELL M. GOLD **
American criminal law vastly overuses pretrial detention even as it purports to
presume defendants innocent. This Article compares financial incentives in
pretrial detention to those in civil preliminary injunctions. Both are procedures
where one of the parties seeks relief before judgment. And yet, these two
procedures employ financial incentives in opposite ways. Civil procedure
discourages interim relief by requiring plaintiffs to bear financial risk when they
obtain a preliminary injunction. Criminal law does the opposite—encouraging
interim relief by requiring defendants to pay to avoid pretrial detention. The
reasons that civil procedure relies on financial incentives to discourage requests
for interim relief—to avoid undue settlement pressure and compensate for losses
inflicted on defendants because of hasty procedure—apply with at least as much
force in criminal law. Thus, this Article contends that employing diametrically
opposed approaches to interim relief in the two systems is not justifiable.
This disparity is troubling because it better protects the property rights of the
wealthy over the liberty rights of the poor. Perhaps this troubling disparity should
not be altogether surprising, however, because it embodies well-recognized
pathologies in criminal law. The incentive disparity is one more way in which
criminal law allows prosecutors not to bear the full costs of their decisions and
averts the budget discipline that could constrain prosecutors—a variant of the
“correctional free lunch.” This Article brings together several different strands of
criminal law literature under the correctional free lunch umbrella while adding
the financial incentive disparity regarding interim relief as yet one more
correctional free lunch. Lastly, the comparative lens provides further support for
widespread concern that criminal law is racist and classist because the financial
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incentive disparity tracks predictable disparities in race, wealth, and power
between the civil and criminal systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly half a million people sit in jail every day in America because they
have been accused of a crime. 1 That is far too many. 2 In New York, for example,
88% of defendants remain jailed after arraignment—or at least did before the
2019 reforms. 3 Widespread pretrial detention has little to commend it: it
deprives people of their liberty before being afforded much process, 4 trivializes

1. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc
/TQ9P-RMYS] (noting that 470,000 people were held in state pretrial detention in the United States).
2. See, e.g., SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT
BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 77–92 (2018) (providing detailed cost-benefit
analyses showing that an optimal resolution would mean detaining a very limited set of high-risk
defendants pretrial). See generally Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) (explaining
the many ways in which criminal law erroneously equates arrest with guilt).
3. Robert Lewis, No Bail Money Keeps Poor People Behind Bars, WNYC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2013),
www.wnyc.org/story/bail-keeps-poor-people-behind-bars [https://perma.cc/NX3Z-X8JY]. Early
results in New York show a more than 40% decrease in unsentenced defendants sitting in the State’s
jails. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., JAIL POPULATION IN NEW YORK STATE
(2020),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/jail_population.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/AU6E-4K57]; see also Lauren Jones, On Bail Reform We Need Less Fear-Based Speculation—and More
Data, VERA INST. JUST.: THINK JUST. BLOG (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.vera.org/blog/on-bailreform-we-need-less-fear-based-speculation-and-more-data
[https://perma.cc/8YTG-N234]
(summarizing data on the early effects of New York bail reform). Yet those successes will likely wane
amidst New York’s recent rollback. See Melissa Gira Grant, The Shock Doctrine Came for Bail Reform,
NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 7, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157205/shock-doctrine-came-bailreform [https://perma.cc/WEH3-CPWN (dark archive)].
4. See Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501, 515–23 (2019) [hereinafter Gold,
Jail as Injunction].
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the presumption of innocence, 5 makes the public less safe because pretrial
detention increases crime, 6 and wastes a lot of money in the process by locking
up a lot of people who are not dangerous. 7
In criminal law, prosecutors bring cases that seek to deprive defendants of
their liberty, typically by way of incarceration. Such post-conviction
punishment seeks to serve the familiar aims of criminal law, including
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation. 8 But pretrial detention allows
prosecutors to obtain their ultimate goal of incarcerating defendants not after
defendants are afforded process—such as the rights to see all material
exculpatory evidence against them, to a trial by a jury of their peers, to call or
cross-examine witnesses at such a trial, or to testify in their own defense.
Rather, pretrial detention affords the government, before judgment, the
ultimate relief that it seeks. 9
Widespread pretrial detention was not always the American way.
Historically, defendants had a right to release on bail in all non-capital cases
rooted in the Due Process Clause’s presumption of innocence. 10 Judges faced

5. See generally Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723
(2011) (arguing that the dwindling presumption of innocence violates detainees’ due process rights).
6. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 161 (“Even short periods of pretrial detention increase
the risk of recidivism.”); Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of
High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 494–96 (2016); Paul Heaton,
Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention,
69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 759–68 (2017); CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND &
ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION 19 (2013), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF
_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/63LS-C4Q5].
7. Detaining the accused costs between $9 billion and $12 billion per year in direct expenditures.
See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 158 (calculating a cost of $9 billion); PATRICK LIU, RYAN NUNN &
JAY SHAMBAUGH, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE ECONOMICS OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION 13 (2018), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/the_economics_of_bail_and_pretrial
_detention [https://perma.cc/L6LV-LLU6] (estimating a cost of $11.71 billion based on payments to
private prisons). A robust cost-benefit analysis that goes beyond the mere financial outlay calculates
that pretrial detention reform could save $78 billion over the course of a decade. Shima Baradaran
Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017) [hereinafter Baughman, Costs of
Pretrial Detention]. Shima Baughman rightly calls this “a massive burden on many state and local
economies.” BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 8.
8. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 325
(2004). So too could we add providing comfort to victims or rehabilitation to this list, though it is hard
to see American criminal law as meaningfully serving either goal well.
9. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14 (explaining that pretrial detention
constitutes interim relief in criminal law akin to civil preliminary injunctions).
10. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 3; Baradaran, supra note 5, at 727–36; Shima Baradaran
Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 857 (2018) [hereinafter Baughman,
The History of Misdemeanor Bail]; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“From the passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 to the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46 (a) (1), federal law
has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail.”
(citation omitted)).
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fines if they did not release defendants charged with misdemeanors. 11 Although
pretrial detention rates have waxed and waned over time, they have risen fairly
steadily over the past three decades. 12 As Shima Baradaran Baughman explains
it, “pretrial detention has become the norm rather than the exception.” 13
Unfortunately, she’s right. “Since the 1990s, pretrial detention rates have risen
72 percent.” 14 In a short period of time, the United States went from detaining
44% of our accused to detaining 60% 15 —a sizable shift for a country that
incarcerates as many people as ours does. 16 These numbers will hopefully
decline again amidst recent reforms,17 but the number of Americans deprived
of their liberty on mere accusation remains high.
In the American civil legal system, by contrast, disputes typically involve
money and property rights rather than liberty. Granting a civil litigant before
trial the relief that it seeks from the litigation is “an extraordinary remedy.” 18
Civil defendants’ property interests are so important that we do not extinguish
or even suspend them lightly. 19 The civil system does not rely solely on the due
process backdrop or on judges to protect those rights by applying a stringent
test that sparingly grants such relief. 20 Nor does the civil system merely trust
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 10, at 845.
BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4; see also LIU ET AL., supra note 7, at 4 fig.1A (charting this increase).
BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
See DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 2 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8HM-5QDM] (reporting a total
correctional population of 6.6 million and a total incarcerated population of 2.2 million at the end of
2016).
17. Although important, releases due to COVID-19 seem unlikely to meaningfully change the
national numbers. Cf. Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 15) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing for
releasing pretrial detainees as a response to COVID-19).
18. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In a previous work I explain
why civil preliminary injunctions provide a helpful basis for broadly rethinking the pretrial detention
system. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14.
19. Although most of this Article focuses on comparing pretrial detention to preliminary
injunctions, procedural due process imposes significant restraints on prejudgment property restraints
such as seizure or attachment in the civil system. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due
Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 22 (2006) (“It is not an exaggeration to say that defendants
constitutionally may be arrested, charged, prosecuted, and detained in prison pending trial with fewer
meaningful review procedures—that is to say, procedures to test the legitimacy of the underlying
charges—than due process would require in the preliminary stages of a private civil case seeking the
return of household goods.”); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (reversing on due
process grounds prejudgment attachment done without prior notice or hearing). For a more extensive
explication of this case law, see generally Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Modern Views as to Validity,
Under Federal Constitution, of State Prejudgment Attachment, Garnishment, and Replevin Procedures,
Distraint Procedures Under Landlords’ or Innkeepers’ Lien Statutes, and Like Procedures Authorizing Summary
Seizure of Property, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 223 (2020).
20. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (articulating that stringent doctrinal test as a gloss on Rule 65).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (2020)

2020]

PAYING FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION

1259

plaintiffs’ lawyers’ best “even-handed” judgment to limit their requests for
interim relief to those cases where it is sufficiently important. 21 Rather, the civil
system relies instead on financial incentives to limit requests for interim relief.
Civil parties—the government included, in at least some jurisdictions 22—accept
monetary risk when they seek a preliminary injunction; plaintiffs who obtain a
preliminary injunction accept the risk of paying damages that the preliminary
injunction causes the defendant if the plaintiff ultimately loses on the merits. 23
Thus, civil parties seek interim relief only when it is sufficiently valuable to
them to bear the risk, which limits the requests for such extraordinary relief.
In criminal law, where liberty is at stake and we purportedly presume
defendants innocent until proven guilty, we should expect to see at least the
same degree of caution before imposing a prejudgment deprivation. We would
be sorely mistaken. Instead of treating prejudgment relief as extraordinary as
the civil system does, criminal law deprives defendants of their liberty before
trial as its default position. 24
Disparate financial incentives encourage this disparity in defendants’
prejudgment rights between the two systems. 25 Civil and criminal procedure
both rely on financial incentives to regulate interim relief, but they do so in
opposite ways. While civil plaintiffs bear a financial risk when they seek interim
relief, prosecutors face no such financial incentive to discourage them from
seeking to lock up those presumed innocent. Nor does the judge have any such
incentive. To the contrary, in criminal law, the financial burden regarding
interim relief typically falls on the detained defendant: most defendants are
detained unless they can pay for their freedom by posting bail. 26 Thus, rather
21. Criminal law embraces a wide berth for prosecutorial discretion, including trusting
prosecutors to protect the rights of the other side—criminal defendants. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). By contrast, the analogous term on the civil side,
“plaintiff’s lawyer discretion,” rings strangely and is never employed as a method of safeguarding
defendants’ rights. Indeed, the civil system deploys judges to formally rein in plaintiff’s lawyer
discretion such as through limiting punitive damages, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (holding that a punitive damage award of $145 million violated defendants’
due process rights when compensatory damages totaled only $1 million), or limiting attorney’s fee
awards, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (requiring that attorney’s fees be based on actual
benefit to class members).
22. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).
24. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 3–4. It is certainly at least arguable that criminal law should
attach greater procedural due process protections pretrial. See Kuckes, supra note 19, at 7. But this
Article is not focused on the due process floor but rather a sensible statutory or rule-based approach to
pretrial detention.
25. Substantive and procedural differences between the way interim relief operates in the two
different systems also contribute to the disparate outcomes. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at
514–32.
26. See, e.g., JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
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than imposing a financial incentive on the government to limit requests for
interim relief akin to civil plaintiffs, criminal law frequently imposes monetary
requirements on the targets of interim relief, therefore making interim relief
more likely.
This disparity is troubling. The reasons that civil systems use financial risk
to limit plaintiffs’ use of preliminary injunctions—limiting requests for interim
relief and compensating for harms caused by interim relief—apply with even
greater force in criminal law. 27 Just as preliminary injunctions afford plaintiffs
substantial settlement leverage and are therefore tactically quite desirable,28 so
too does pretrial detention afford massive settlement leverage to the
government. 29 Financial incentives to temper strategic use of interim relief
therefore make sense in criminal law as they do in civil procedure. Moreover,
criminal defendants suffer serious harm because of pretrial detention—
sometimes loss of employment, housing, custody of a child, and serious
psychological harm. 30 Pretrial detention decisions are made following an
extremely summary “judicial process” that may involve a one-minute hearing
with no evidence, judge, lawyers, or written briefing. 31 In some places, bail is
determined via videoconference with a judge or even by a bail commissioner in
a jail through a speaker system in a plexiglass wall. 32 That the stakes for a
criminal defendant are liberty rather than property (and sometimes both) 33
suggests too that some mechanism to encourage restraint and perhaps
compensate for harms resulting from summary process makes even more sense
LOCAL PRACTICE 19 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial
%20Disparities%20Report%20062515.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6WA-TX7F] (finding that 61% of
defendants are detained unless they can post bail). Some defendants are simply ordered detained
without bail and others are released with or without conditions, but setting bail is the most common
resolution.
27. Pretrial detention should also employ a more stringent test—like preliminary injunctions—
that requires the government to demonstrate likely irreparable injury if a defendant is not detained,
balances the interests of all involved, and requires the government to submit evidence showing a
likelihood of success on the merits. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 559. But the substantive
test itself is beyond the scope of this Article.
28. See infra Section II.A.
29. See infra Section II.B.
30. E.g., Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 10, at 842 n.33; Gold, Jail as
Injunction, supra note 4, at 539–43.
31. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 1, 7; Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 515–19;
Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 730; Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1399, 1452 (2017).
32. See Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The
Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1733 & n.61 (2002);
Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 21, 25 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy
_for_justice/2_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3_Pretrial-Detention-and-Bail.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8G9Z-QTM2].
33. If the defendant has to pay a bail bondsman a 10% non-refundable fee for the privilege of
securing freedom, then the defendant was first deprived of liberty and then property before trial.
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in the criminal context than in the civil one. Without seeking to sketch out a
structure for such a change, this Article broadly suggests resolving the disparity
by leveling up protections for defendants in the criminal system to match those
in the civil system. 34
As troubling and unjustified as this disparity is, it should not be altogether
surprising. Indeed, it evinces and bolsters the literature regarding two known
pathologies in criminal law. First, financial incentives encouraging pretrial
detention represent one more correctional free lunch: the idea, in its original
form, that county-level prosecutors spend the state’s money to imprison
defendants and thus need not consider the full costs of their decisions. 35 This
Article unites several strands of criminal law scholarship under a broader
correctional free lunch umbrella because they all represent different ways of
making criminal law too cheap by allowing prosecutors’ offices to avoid bearing
the full costs of their decisions. These misalignments of incentives avert the
potentially constraining effect of budget discipline on prosecutors’ decisions.
This Article then situates financial incentives regarding pretrial detention as
one more example of this broadened correctional free lunch literature. Second,
that this disparity better protects the pretrial rights of civil defendants (who are
often wealthy and White) rather than those of criminal defendants (who are
often poor people of color) highlights a previously unrecognized source of
structural racism and classism in American criminal law. 36
This Article contends that the disparate use of financial incentives in the
civil and criminal systems whereby civil procedure discourages interim relief
and criminal procedure encourages it is troubling and unjustifiable. The Article
proceeds in three parts. Part I explains why preliminary injunctions provide a
useful comparison for analyzing pretrial detention and situates this comparison
in the emerging body of domestic civil-criminal comparative law literature. Part
II explains how the preliminary injunction system employs financial incentives
to limit parties’ requests for such interim relief and why the justifications for
such financial incentives apply with even more force to pretrial detention. Part
III broadens the lens and situates this disparity within—and considers its
contribution to—other existing bodies of criminal law scholarship.

34. This Article’s objective is conceptual and focused on critiquing and explaining the existing
disparity. It does not aim to address the practicalities of how financial incentives to limit pretrial
detention would work, such as considering at which of the powerful actors in the pretrial detention
system financial incentives should be targeted—judges, prosecutors, or both. Nor does it consider
whether fines, rewards, or a limited fund would best implement such incentives.
35. Infra Section III.A.
36. Infra Section III.B.
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I. EXPLAINING THE COMPARISON
Preliminary injunctions provide a useful comparison to pretrial detention
because these procedures are the primary ways that the civil and criminal
systems deal with the question of interim relief: what happens to the parties’
rights before the case can be resolved. 37 Both bodies of law ultimately afford
one side to a dispute, before judgment, at least some measure of the relief that
it seeks. In so doing, these bodies of law seek to minimize harm during the
pendency of the case. 38 So too do they seek to ensure the efficacy of judicial
proceedings. 39 And, as a practical matter, both preliminary injunctions and
pretrial detention have huge practical implications for the resolution of the
dispute. In criminal law, for instance, defendants who are detained pretrial are
much more likely to be convicted and face harsher sentences than defendants
who can mount their defense from outside of jail. 40 Similarly, preliminary
injunctions tip a judge’s hand about her ultimate view on the case’s merits and
are thought to potentially lock in that view. 41
This comparison between pretrial detention and preliminary injunctions
is one line in an emerging literature comparing American criminal and civil
procedure. 42 Although the systems of course differ in some respects, both seek
to resolve disputes and, at least broadly, strive for “fairness, accuracy, and
efficiency—albeit in different mixtures.” 43 One seemingly insurmountable
37. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14.
38. Pretrial detention serves this objective akin to the aim of preliminary injunctions. Id. at 507–
09. This comparison fits more closely after the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat.
214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), allowed courts to consider the likelihood
that the defendant will be arrested for another crime in the interim when determining bail. See
BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 24–27 (describing the historical evolution of the purposes of bail); see also
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747–52 (1987) (countenancing preventing future crime as a
permissible purpose of pretrial detention).
39. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14.
40. E.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 5; Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 715; CHRISTOPHER T.
LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD
FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING
OUTCOMES 10–11 (2013), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report
_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKM7-NNL2].
41. Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 779 (2014);
see also Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 573, 600 (2001).
42. See generally, e.g., Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2017)
[hereinafter Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers] (comparing class counsel to prosecutors and arguing that
internal checks similar to those in prosecutors’ offices would improve class counsel accountability); Ion
Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39 (2014) (arguing that the
civil and criminal procedural systems should be more similar than different); David A. Sklansky &
Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal
Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683 (2006) (calling for comparative work between domestic
civil and criminal procedure and laying out the theoretical foundations for such work). For more
information canvassing the literature, see also Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 509–14.
43. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 42, at 684.
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difference between criminal and civil procedure is the divide between public
and private law. But criminal law is not purely public law nor is civil litigation
purely private. 44 Prosecutors are required to consider victims’ interests and may
often seek restitution, including substantial amounts in some cases. 45 Civil
litigation not only seeks to provide redress to particular plaintiffs but also seeks
to deter wrongdoing, which benefits non-parties. 46
Previous work has considered how criminal law could develop a more
robust and balanced test for pretrial detention modeled on the preliminary
injunction standard. 47 In short, such an approach would treat relief before
judgment as an extraordinary measure that should be available only when the
side seeking it would likely suffer irreparable harm absent such relief. 48 In the
pretrial detention context, that would mean that detention—the relief the
government seeks—is available only when the defendant is likely to abscond
from the jurisdiction or likely to commit a serious crime while on release; 49 both

44. See id. at 701–04; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–87 (1984)
(arguing that the purpose of adjudication is not merely private dispute resolution and that settlement
often brings peace for the parties at the expense of justice for society); Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra
note 42, at 99–100 (explaining that class actions and criminal prosecutions share important similarities,
including in their public and private law objectives). That some conduct such as subway fare evasion
has been reclassified from criminal to civil or administrative also suggests as much. See, e.g., Faiz
Siddiqui, D.C. Council Decriminalizes Metro Fare Evasion: ‘I’m Sad That’s Metro’s Losing Money, but I’m
More Sad About What’s Happening to Black People.’, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 7:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/12/05/dc-council-decriminalizes-metro-fareevasion-giving-its-final-approval-contested-measure/ [https://perma.cc/58B2-XZX2 (dark archive)];
Council Votes To Make Major Changes to Metro’s Fare Enforcement Policy, KING COUNTY
COUNCIL NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.kingcounty.gov/council/news/2015/October/10-26DU-fareenforcement.aspx [https://perma.cc/PH2Q-TVU7].
45. See Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
1385, 1387–88, 1398 (2011) (discussing criminal cases establishing large “restitution funds” to
compensate victims and comparing these restitution remedies to class actions).
46. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 785 (8th ed. 2011).
47. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 532–58.
48. Id.
49. Absconders and further crime are serious concerns that pretrial detention seeks to avoid, but
only in cases where such concerns are quite strong will they likely outweigh the harm that pretrial
detention will inflict on the defendant. See id.
This Article and my prior work conceive of the government’s request for pretrial detention
as the relevant request for interim relief. Existing doctrine and its use of money bail seem to conceive
instead of the government having widespread ability to detain defendants upon arrest and rather view
the defendant’s request for bail or other form of pretrial liberty as the request for interim relief. This
divergence poses a difficult baseline or status-quo-definition problem that these works do not address
in detail. For these purposes, suffice it to say that this Article and Jail as Injunction view the
government’s request for pretrial detention—whether through unaffordable bail or more directly—as
the requested interim relief because that is the first request for a judicial order to change the rights that
the parties had prior to the commencement of criminal enforcement. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra
note 4, at 509–14. Moreover, such an approach better respects the presumption of innocence than does
a baseline notion that the government can typically detain defendants on a mere accusation of
wrongdoing and a finding that the low probable cause threshold has been met. See Baradaran, supra
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formulations are much more stringent thresholds than the bases on which judges
now detain defendants, including by setting unaffordable bail. 50 So too would a
pretrial detention regime based on preliminary injunctions account for the
substantial harm that pretrial detention would inflict on each defendant and her
loved ones—such as loss of employment, housing, or custody of a child;
increased likelihood of conviction; and the likelihood of a longer sentence. 51
Courts would balance these harms to the defendant against the benefits of
detaining the defendant—namely, avoiding flight and further crime while on
release. 52 Lastly, courts would detain defendants only when the government is
likely to succeed on the merits of its case. 53
Even if the substantive and procedural law of pretrial detention were
reformed to better align with the preliminary injunction standard, one
particularly troubling aspect of the disparity between those two procedures
would remain: criminal law structures financial incentives to encourage pretrial
detention while civil procedure structures financial incentives to discourage it.
This Article critiques that disparity.
II. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR INTERIM RELIEF
Interestingly, both preliminary injunctions and pretrial detention employ
financial incentives. They just do so in opposite ways. With preliminary
injunctions, defendants who are preliminarily enjoined but are ultimately
victorious on the merits get compensated because their property interests were
“wrongfully enjoined” during the pendency of the case. 54 But barring truly
egregious circumstances, criminal defendants whose liberty was wrongfully
restrained during the pendency of the case receive nothing. 55 In fact, in criminal
law, it is the party to be restrained—the defendant—who (often) must pay
money bail to avoid that restraint. 56 Preliminary injunctions, on the other hand,
note 5, at 767–68 (explaining that the presumption of innocence is rooted in the Due Process Clause
and that it requires pretrial liberty absent serious flight risk).
50. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 523–32 (discussing the empirical literature); Paul
Heaton, The Expansive Reach of Pretrial Detention, 98 N.C. L. REV. 369, 371–73 (2020) (summarizing
the recent empirical evidence); see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 4 (providing powerful statistics
regarding the widespread use of pretrial detention in America).
51. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 540–45; see also Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115
MICH. L. REV. 307, 313–20 (2016) (describing harms that arrests cause).
52. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 539–52.
53. Id.
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). In this context, “wrongfully” does not mean issued in error but
simply issued in a way that does not align with the ultimate merits outcome. See Nintendo of Am., Inc.
v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1994); Am. Bible Soc’y v. Blount, 446 F.2d
588, 594–95 (3d Cir. 1971).
55. See Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1952 (2005).
56. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 157–85 (explaining the continued prevalence of money bail
despite recent reforms eliminating it in some jurisdictions). Further reforms have come into effect
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require the party seeking interim relief to post a bond to obtain such relief, and
that bond gets paid to the restrained party if the movant ultimately loses on the
merits.
Plaintiffs—including the government, in at least some jurisdictions 57 —
bear financial risk when seeking interim relief in the civil system for two
reasons: First, so that they will not overuse that extraordinary mechanism,
including by using it simply to procure a settlement advantage. 58 Second,
preliminary injunction damages can compensate defendants whose property
interests are wrongfully restrained during the pendency of the case. 59 Like
preliminary injunctions, this Article explains that pretrial detention is an
since Baughman’s book was published, though some of those sit on fragile footing. See, e.g., INSHA
RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2019 BAIL
REFORM LAW 11 (July 2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/new-york-new-york2019-bail-reform-law-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/26HK-BRGC] (discussing New York’s 2019
reforms); Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out To Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are in.,
ARNOLD VENTURES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-toreform-its-cash-bail-system-now-the-results-are-in/ [https://perma.cc/Z4ZG-BG9U] (discussing New
Jersey bail reform); Grant, supra note 3 (explaining that the Governor of New York signed a partial
repeal of the bail reform in the most recent budget bill); Vanessa Romo, California Becomes First State
To End Cash Bail After 40-Year Fight, NPR (Aug. 28, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018
/08/28/642795284/california-becomes-first-state-to-end-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/PR7X-HN5Y].
57. N.C. R. CIV. P. 65(c) (“No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon
the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the judge deems proper, for the payment of such
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained. No such security shall be required of the State of North Carolina or of any
county or municipality thereof, or any officer or agency thereof acting in an official capacity, but
damages may be awarded against such party in accord with this rule.” (emphasis added)); Marine Constr. &
Dredging v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 88-3963, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 23496, at *8–9 (9th
Cir. Dec. 13, 1989) (explaining in dictum that the United States is “potentially liable for damages for
allegedly wrongfully seeking an injunction . . . despite the fact that no bond was posted”); Corpus
Christi Gas Co. v. City of Corpus Christi, 46 F.2d 962, 963 (5th Cir. 1931) (holding that the City of
Corpus Christi was required to pay damages caused by an injunction that it obtained even though it
was excused from the bond requirement); Provident Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Treasure Island, 796 So.
2d 481, 487 (Fla. 2001) (holding that government entities excluded from bond requirements may
nevertheless be liable for monetary damages upon the reversal of “an improperly entered temporary
injunction”); Juniata Foods, Inc. v. Mifflin Cty. Dev. Auth., 486 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985) (finding a government agency liable for damages despite bond exemption because “a bond is not
a condition precedent to obtaining damages from a governmental entity”). But see FTC v. Apply
Knowledge, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00088 (DB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188887, at *6–7 (D. Utah Apr. 9,
2015) (holding that the United States was not required to pay damages for a wrongful injunction claim
because such a claim was barred by sovereign immunity but offering no opinion on whether such a
claim would be viable in contract and thus fall within the federal government’s waiver of sovereign
immunity under the Tucker Act); FTC v. Bf Labs Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00815-BCW, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 184640, at *4–7 (W.D. Mo. June 15, 2015) (relying on Apply Knowledge for the conclusion that
sovereign immunity bars a claim for wrongful injunction); Egge v. Lane County, 556 P.2d 1372, 1373
(Or. 1976) (in banc) (hypothesizing that the legislature’s intent in exempting state governmental bodies
from the bond requirement was to ensure their immunity).
58. See Dan B. Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunctive Relief,
52 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1094, 1112 (1974).
59. See id. at 1094.
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extraordinary measure that affords one side (the government) substantial
settlement leverage. That mechanism thus could be usefully limited by
imposing a financial incentive to discourage the government from seeking such
relief rather than using financial incentives to discourage the defendant from
avoiding pretrial detention. So too could a financial structure parallel to that for
preliminary injunctions sensibly compensate defendants for the harm that
interim relief causes after a very hasty judicial process.
Section I.A explains why the civil system requires injunction bonds—a
financial incentive meant to limit requests for interim relief and compensate for
the harms that such relief may cause. Section I.B then explains why those same
reasons that justify injunction bonds apply with at least as much force to similar
concerns in the criminal legal system with pretrial detention.
A.

Financial Incentives To Limit Preliminary Injunctions

Civil procedure 60 treats preliminary injunctions—orders restraining a
defendant’s property interest before the defendant has been afforded
adjudicatory process 61 —as “extraordinary remed[ies] never awarded as of
right.” 62 But it does not merely rely on judges to say so and deny the vast
majority of requests to ensure that interim relief remains extraordinary. Rather,
civil procedure relies on financial incentives to limit requests for this
extraordinary relief before judges are ever called upon to resolve them.
Plaintiffs cannot obtain a preliminary injunction unless they first post a bond. 63
In posting a bond, plaintiffs bear a financial risk: if the plaintiff obtains a
preliminary injunction but the court ultimately holds that the defendant is
entitled to conduct the enjoined activity, the bond money goes to pay the
60. Although there are multiple systems of civil procedure in the United States, this Article
focuses largely on the federal system for purposes of the comparison. Aside from an important
difference as to whether the government bears financial risk when seeking interim relief, see sources
cited supra note 57, the differences between the way that different states and the federal system handle
preliminary injunctions are fairly minimal, see, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218
(Tex. 1968) (reciting a standard similar to the federal one); see also DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L.
ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 203 & n.783 (3d. ed. 2018)
(explaining that “[v]irtually all states have statutes or court rules,” and many of them replicate the
federal rule as to injunction bonds); Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1096–97 (“Except for Massachusetts, all
states make some statutory (or rule) provision for an injunction bond. Historically most of them seem
to have been derived, ultimately, from either the federal rule or its statutory predecessors, or from the
New York Code of 1848.”).
61. See, e.g., 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (2013) (describing preliminary injunctions as restraints on
conduct—typically the defendant’s—that go into effect pending a decision on the merits of a case); see
also, e.g., John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 525 (1978)
(explaining the practical ramifications of preliminary injunctions in various types of cases and
explaining that they are “[i]ssued without a full hearing on the merits of the case”).
62. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
63. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (2020)

2020]

PAYING FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION

1267

defendant for damages caused by the preliminary injunction. 64 When the
government seeks a preliminary injunction it need not post a bond, but it
remains liable for damages as private plaintiffs do, at least in some
jurisdictions. 65 Requiring an American litigant to compensate an opponent for
erroneous judicial decisionmaking is itself extraordinary, 66 and exploring the
reasons for this extraordinary measure in the preliminary injunction context
proves helpful for the comparison to pretrial detention.
That plaintiffs bear financial risk limits preliminary injunctions by
discouraging plaintiffs from seeking them. 67 Remedies scholars recognize that
preliminary injunctions afford plaintiffs substantial leverage over defendants,68
and plaintiffs’ potential responsibility for damages on a preliminary injunction
urges hesitation before acquiring such leverage. 69 The origins of this leverage
are two-fold: First, the defendant is prevented from engaging in potentially
lucrative behavior while the case is pending, so the defendant has a strong
incentive to seek some resolution that allows it to continue the behavior in
question. 70 Second, because ruling on a preliminary injunction requires a court
to consider the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, the parties can
rightly view any ruling on such a motion as a strong indication of the judge’s
view of the merits. 71 Of course that indication is preliminary and without the
benefit of a fully developed record, but it provides a useful signal to the parties
nonetheless. 72 A grant therefore provides significant settlement leverage for
plaintiffs. 73 To gain that settlement leverage, plaintiffs—at least in the absence
64. Id.
65. See sources cited supra note 57.
66. Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Remedies for Wrongfully-Issued Preliminary Injunctions: The
Case for Disgorgement of Profits, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 903, 920–21 (2009); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (explaining the American rule that losing parties do
not pay the attorney’s fees of the winning party), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
note (2018)).
67. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094.
68. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 41, at 573–74.
69. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094.
70. See id. (explaining that plaintiffs can face “enormous pressures” as a result of the immediacy
of having to cease an activity that allegedly constitutes a nuisance without an opportunity to defend
itself in full).
71. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 41, at 586–87 (explaining that a “preliminary injunction
hearing may be a relatively cheap way to obtain information about how a court would rule in an eventual
trial,” thus facilitating settlement).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 573–74 (describing strategic use of preliminary injunctions to improve bargaining
position); Lynch, supra note 41, at 781 (expressing concern that judges articulating a view of the merits
of a case for purposes of a preliminary injunction would be too inclined to maintain that view even on
a more developed record); cf. Bert I. Huang, Essay, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1341–
42 (2013) (explaining, in regard to summary judgment and settlement dynamics, that “[n]othing quite
cures overoptimism like a judge remarking, on the eve of trial, that in her view the case is a loser”).
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of any financial risk—would have a strong tactical incentive to pursue
preliminary injunctions in every case where such a request was nonfrivolous. 74
Requiring plaintiffs to bear the risk of compensating wrongfully enjoined
defendants helps alter the incentive to pursue every nonfrivolous request by
encouraging plaintiffs to limit their requests to the most important and
meritorious cases. 75 It discourages them from using preliminary injunctions
solely to gain a leverage advantage. 76 It seeks to “discourage too easy an access
to the judicial process in those cases where that process does not involve a full
trial of the issues.”77 Or to put this in law and economics terms, the requirement
for plaintiffs to pay damages to wrongfully enjoined defendants seeks to force
plaintiffs to internalize the risks that their request poses to defendants whose
rights are subject to less than full judicial process. A plaintiff should seek a
preliminary injunction when its expected benefits to the plaintiff outweigh its
expected costs—damages. 78
The bond requirement and damages paid to preliminarily-enjoined
defendants who prevail on the merits also serve a compensatory purpose. 79 The
idea is that defendants who have not yet been afforded full process and the
opportunity to develop their factual records or legal arguments should not bear
74. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094. Courts do not frequently deem litigation or even a particular
litigation tactic frivolous. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas E. Willging & Donna Stienstra, The
Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Rule 11, FJC DIRECTIONS (SPECIAL ISSUE), Nov. 1991, at 12 (reporting
empirical results showing that the median judges surveyed imposed sanctions in two cases over a oneyear period); Mark R. Kravitz, Unpleasant Duties: Imposing Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 4 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 335, 343 (2002) (noting that some courts are reluctant to impose sanctions for
frivolous appeals even though they have the statutory authority to do so, which, of course, would have
a negative effect on deterrence); Roger J. Miner, Lecture, Professional Responsibility in Appellate Practice:
A View from the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV. 323, 341 (1999) (“[I]t is a rare case in which we sanction even
those who take frivolous appeals.”).
75. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094 (explaining that plaintiffs will seek interim relief only when “in
genuine need of such relief and reasonably confident of the outcome”); id. at 1112 (“The threat of
potential liability, however, may serve to screen out unwarranted claims . . . .”); see also Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 649 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that a plaintiff will not seek a
preliminary injunction unless he is “confiden[t] in his legal position” because of the risk of paying
damages and analogizing the damages requirement to a warranty).
76. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094, 1112.
77. Id. at 1094; Erin Connors Morton, Note, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c):
Exceptions to the Rule Gone Awry, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1863, 1867 (1995) (requiring plaintiffs to bear the
risk of damages serves to “deter rash applications for interlocutory orders and thus avoids wasting the
court’s time with flimsy applications”).
78. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic
Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005) (arguing that an
important function of preliminary injunctions is to promote efficiency); Thomas D. Jeitschko &
Byung-Cheol Kim, Signaling, Learning, and Screening Prior to Trial: Informational Implications of
Preliminary Injunctions, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1085 (2013) (finding that some plaintiffs request
preliminary injunctions “to signal bounds on their damages in order to elicit better settlement offers”).
79. Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1112 (explaining that the financial risk to plaintiffs of wrongfully
obtaining a preliminary injunction “protect[s] defendants whose rights have been dismembered without
a full hearing”).
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the risk of an erroneous judicial decision; they thus should be compensated to
the extent that the court’s quick resolution of the issue turns out, on further
consideration, not to in fact reflect the merits of the dispute. 80
In sum, the civil system requires plaintiffs to bear the financial risk of
seeking a preliminary injunction by paying damages when defendants are
wrongfully preliminarily enjoined. Requiring plaintiffs to bear such risk
recognizes that plaintiffs receive substantial settlement leverage from a
preliminary injunction and imposes a financial incentive to dissuade plaintiffs
from pursuing interim relief too frequently. So too does it compensate
defendants for harms they incur from abbreviated judicial process.
B.

Bases for Financial Incentives Limiting Pretrial Detention

The reasoning that makes financial incentives a sensible way to limit
interim relief in the civil system applies with at least as much force to
prosecutors’ pretrial detention decisions. 81 Detaining a defendant pretrial
affords the government a massive advantage in securing guilty pleas. 82 Financial
incentives could help limit that leverage. 83 As with the civil system, so too
would any compensatory scheme help criminal defendants who are harmed by
drive-by judicial process (if that process involves a judge at all).
Section II.B.1 explains how pretrial detention affords substantial leverage
to prosecutors and imposes substantial costs on defendants as a result of
summary judicial process, much as with preliminary injunctions in civil
litigation. Section II.B.2 accounts for differences between the civil and criminal
80. Id. at 1093–94.
81. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 608 (2017)
(“[P]rosecutors . . . have an incentive to request high bail to ensure leverage over plea bargaining
negotiations.”); see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75
MINN. L. REV. 335, 410–11 (1990).
Pretrial detention in America often turns, as a practical matter, on whether the defendant can
afford to pay bail rather than on a binary of a court ordering a defendant released or detained—though
those options too are possible. As in prior work, I refer to pretrial detention here as either a court
denying bail entirely or a court setting bail that the defendant cannot afford and therefore results in
the defendant’s detention.
82. E.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REV. 837,
860; Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 556 (2018); Simonson, supra note
81, at 610.
83. Although they have done so without the civil system as a basis for comparison, some scholars
have called for compensation for acquitted defendants who were detained pretrial. See generally, e.g.,
Gabriel Doménech & Miguel Puchades, Compensating Acquitted Pre-Trial Detainees, 43 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 167 (2015) (analyzing the deterrent effect of compensating acquitted pretrial detainees and
arguing that in some situations compensation can deter crime); Manns, supra note 55 (conceptualizing
pretrial detentions as “liberty takings” that require compensation); see also Miller & Guggenheim, supra
note 81, at 411 (mentioning in passing the idea of requiring the government to compensate acquitted
defendants for time spent in pretrial detention in an amount determined by the number of days
detained). One article suggests such compensation to “temper[]” the government’s incentive to seek
pretrial detention. Manns, supra note 55, at 1950.
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systems, many of which make the disparate use of financial incentives all the
more egregious.
1. Pretrial Detention as Prosecutorial Leverage
As with preliminary injunctions, 84 pretrial detention skews case outcomes
on the merits. This leverage dynamic in civil procedure is intuitively sensible
for reasons explained earlier, 85 though I am not aware of empirical evidence
trying to demonstrate its effects. In criminal law, it is quite clear through
empirical evidence that pretrial detention worsens defendants’ outcomes, albeit
for somewhat different reasons: defendants detained before trial are more likely
to plead guilty, more likely to be convicted, and face longer sentences than
similarly situated defendants who are not detained before trial. 86
One extraordinarily important reason for defendants’ worse outcomes
when detained pretrial is that pretrial detention provides a powerful prod for
defendants to plead guilty. 87 This leverage is particularly powerful when
prosecutors offer defendants the opportunity to go home immediately by
pleading guilty and receiving a sentence of time served rather than staying in
jail for how many ever months (or years) it may take for a court to try their
case. 88 Pretrial detention also skews merits outcomes because it is quite difficult
84. See generally Lynch, supra note 41 (expressing concern that courts finding plaintiffs are likely
to succeed on the merits at the preliminary injunction stage will then be “locked in” to that finding
and, thus, more likely to ultimately side with the plaintiff on the merits).
85. See supra Section II.A.
86. Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 717; Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV.
201, 201 (2018); Gupta et al., supra note 6, at 473, 475; Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended
Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from NYC Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529,
543–48 (2017); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability To Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 511 (2018).
87. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 161–62; Gouldin, supra note 82, at 860; Mayson, supra note 82,
at 556; Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 81, at 411; Simonson, supra note 81, at 608.
88. See Brief of Amici Curiae Current & Former District & State’s Attorneys, State Attorneys
General, United States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys & Department of Justice
Officials, in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 7, ODonnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir.
2018) (No. 17-20333) (“[T]he accused may see an early guilty plea as the most expedient way to obtain
release, as many misdemeanor defendants are sentenced to time served. This in turn may result in the
conviction of innocent people . . . .”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be
Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1356 (2014) (“In some cases, the periods that defendants spend in jail
awaiting trial is comparable to, or even greater than, their potential sentences, thus substantially
incentivizing quick plea deals regardless of guilt or innocence.”).
Ultimately it is judges rather than prosecutors who control the defendant’s sentence, but
judges’ review of a sentence recommended in a plea bargain is far from stringent. See Russell M. Gold,
“Clientless” Prosecutors, 51 GA. L. REV. 693, 714–16 (2017) [hereinafter Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors].
And prosecutors exercise a great deal of control over sentencing with their charging decisions. See
generally Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 303 (2009) (describing the evolution of prosecutorial discretion and a prosecutor’s
role in seeking substantive justice).
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for the accused to mount a defense and coordinate with their lawyers from jail
in ways that do not apply in the civil system because of the lack of physical
restraint. 89
That leverage dynamic is exacerbated because interim relief—pretrial
detention—inflicts serious harm on criminal defendants and their loved ones. 90
Some defendants lose their jobs, housing, custody of children, and suffer
reduced wages for years to come. 91 Many defendants suffer serious
psychological harm. 92 For the children of incarcerated defendants, their parents’
incarceration is worse for the children’s health and behavior than divorce or
even death of a parent. 93 Avoiding these harms creates an even stronger
leverage dynamic than for civil defendants who seek to avoid having to cease
profitable activity during civil litigation.
The strategic advantage for prosecutors of obtaining interim relief also
exceeds the advantage for civil plaintiffs because the criminal system does not
allow defendants any meaningful “outs” short of going to trial and risking a
harsh penalty at sentencing for doing so. 94 Unlike in civil systems, criminal law
typically affords defendants little meaningful relief on a motion arguing that
the government has not stated a crime, nor do criminal systems have a
procedure akin to summary judgment by which a defendant can argue before
trial that the government has insufficient evidence to prove at least one element
of its case. 95
89. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 521. For defendants who feel confident that they will
be convicted, it is theoretically possible that some might prefer to serve time in county jail immediately
in pretrial detention rather than serve that time later in state prison post-conviction, but conventional
wisdom suggests that conditions in county jails are far worse. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive
Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510,
517 (1986); Kerry Rudd, Opinion, Prop. 47 Spared Offenders from Prison, but They May Find County Jail
Harsher, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Prop-47-sparedoffenders-from-prison-who-then-13413021.php [https://perma.cc/HD2M-RRE9 (dark archive)].
90. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 539–45.
91. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 86; THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS:
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11–12 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts
.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y47MVGWA].
92. Consider Kalief Browder who ended his life after several failed attempts during and after
pretrial detention at Rikers Island. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW
YORKER (June 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015
[https://perma.cc/9XWJ-D6QE (dark archive)].
93. See Kristin Turney, Stress Proliferation Across Generations? Examining the Relationship Between
Parental Incarceration and Childhood Health, 55 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 302, 312, 314 (2014).
94. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing Criminal
Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1614–24 (2017) (explaining the sources of prosecutors’ leverage);
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench
Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973–75 (2005) (observing
substantially higher sentences following jury trials than following guilty pleas for the same crime in the
same courts).
95. Gold et al., supra note 94, at 1635–36, 1639.
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Other criminal procedures do not meaningfully change the leverage
disparity. Criminal law does afford some early review related to the merits
whereas a motion for a preliminary injunction would typically precede any other
merits-related review. But those criminal processes are far from robust inquiries
into the merits and thus afford far less meaningful protection for defendants’
interim interests than one might think at a glance. 96 A judge in a Gerstein
hearing or a preliminary hearing need find only probable cause to believe that
the defendant committed an offense 97 —a less stringent standard than the
likelihood of success inquiry for a preliminary injunction. 98 Indeed, criminal
preliminary hearings are so pro forma that many defendants waive them. 99
The leverage disparity is exacerbated by resource disparities. On the civil
side, defendants tend to have the resource advantage. 100 Most criminal
defendants, by contrast, are vastly out-resourced by the government. 101 Interim
relief affords settlement leverage to the actor who initiates the case—the civil
plaintiff or the government in a criminal case. That leverage aids the lessresourced actor in the civil context but the better-resourced actor in criminal

96. For a more detailed explanation of this reasoning, see Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at
522–23.
97. For a defendant to be detained, some judicial determination of probable cause is required
either before or within forty-eight hours after a defendant is arrested. County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (“[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable
cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of
Gerstein.”). That judicial determination within forty-eight hours is referred to as a Gerstein hearing, and
the idea is that a police officer’s determination of probable cause alone is not enough to detain a
defendant for more than two days’ time. Id.; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring
prompt judicial determination of probable cause). State practices surrounding preliminary hearings
vary significantly, but they typically provide an avenue for a judge to pass upon the merits of felony
allegations and serve as a sort of substitute for a grand jury. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.2(c)–(d) (6th ed. 2017); see also id. § 14.2(a) (describing the lack of
constitutional requirement for such a procedure that thus permits such substantial variation amongst
the states).
98. Alschuler, supra note 89, at 518–19 (citing legislative history for the proposition that Congress
considered and rejected a standard akin to the civil preliminary injunction standard and opted instead
for a more lenient one); Kuckes, supra note 19, at 24 & n.132.
99. See, e.g., 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 97, § 14.2(e) (“[W]aivers by the defense exceed fifty
percent in a substantial number of jurisdictions which provide quite extensive preliminary hearings.”);
see also Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 541, 576 (“[E]ven where a defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing, it has become
so meaningless in some jurisdictions that the defendant typically waives the right . . . .”).
100. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 123–24; Ion Meyn, The Haves of Procedure, 60
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1765, 1774 (2019) (mapping Marc Galanter’s terminology about “haves” and
“have-nots” onto a comparison of resource and power between the civil and criminal systems including
identifying corporate or other entities who are typically defendants as the “haves” of civil litigation).
This resource disparity may be less predictable in some cases where preliminary injunctions are at issue,
such as in patent litigation, but defendants remain the more powerful actors in many civil cases.
101. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 123–24; Meyn, supra note 100, at 1774 (identifying
prosecutors as the “haves” of criminal law and criminal defendants as the “have-nots”).
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cases. As such, the resource disparity compounds the effect of the settlement
leverage that interim relief affords to prosecutors.
Further, compensating defendants for the harms caused by hasty judicial
process makes at least as much sense in pretrial detention as for preliminary
injunctions. Pretrial detention proceedings are far more summary—and thus
error prone—than are civil preliminary injunctions. So too are the costs of
interim deprivation higher from pretrial detention than from preliminary
injunctions.
Preliminary injunctions may seem summary when compared to trials, but
both are vastly more extensive than pretrial detention hearings. 102 Initial
pretrial detention hearings often last as little as one minute. 103 Some systems
determine that an accused defendant should remain incarcerated following an
arrest without any judicial involvement for days. 104 Some systems set an accused
defendant opposite a plexiglass wall from a bail commissioner, and others
simply let the defendant participate through videoconference. 105 By contrast,
even if the briefing schedules are hasty, preliminary injunction motions are
resolved after written briefing and a hearing. To pick a recent example, consider
a preliminary injunction motion in a false advertising dispute: the plaintiff
submitted a 30-page written brief 106 supported by declarations of several
witnesses and more than 300 pages of supporting exhibits. 107 In striking contrast
to criminal defendants’ two-minute “hearing” without briefing, the falseadvertising defendant filed a 29-page written brief supported by expert
declarations, a lay witness declaration, and 122 pages of documents 108 prior to

102. For more details, see Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 514–32. I am not proposing a
compensation scheme here, though others have. See supra note 83. I am simply mapping the
compensatory justification for injunction bonds on the pretrial detention context.
103. Change Difficult as Bail System’s Powerful Hold Continues Punishing the Poor, INJUSTICE WATCH:
UNEQUAL TREATMENT (Oct. 14, 2016), http://injusticewatch.org/interactives/bent-on-bail [https://
perma.cc/7XKK-XKMJ] [hereinafter Change Difficult] (explaining that pretrial detention hearings in
Chicago often last less than two minutes); Length of a Bail Hearing in North Dakota: 3 Minutes, NAT’L
CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://ncforaj.org/2013/01/25/length-of-a-bail-hearingin-north-dakota-3-minutes [https://perma.cc/G6PB-JDAM] [hereinafter Length of a Bail Hearing]
(finding that pretrial detention hearings in North Dakota last for about three minutes); see also
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 32, at 32 (“Currently, bail hearings in many jurisdictions are
shockingly short: only a few minutes per case.”).
104. Colbert et al., supra note 32, at 1719–20.
105. Id. at 1733 & n.61; Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 730.
106. Brief in Support of Elanco’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla
Foods Inc., No. 1:17-cv-703-WCG (E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017), 2017 WL 4570547.
107. Declaration of Grady Bishop, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547; Declaration of Roger A.
Cady, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547; Declaration of Robert J. Collier, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL
4570547; Supplemental Declaration of Grady Bishop, Eli Lilly & Co., 2017 WL 4570547. I excluded
cover pages from this count.
108. Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Eli Lilly &
Co., 2017 WL 4570547.
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the five-and-a-half-hour hearing in a courtroom before a judge to resolve the
motion. 109
Moreover, as discussed in more detail earlier in this section, accused
defendants are substantially harmed by this necessarily hasty judicial process
used to determine pretrial detention. Some defendants will lose employment,
housing, or custody of a child, and defendants may suffer serious psychological
harm.
Based both on the lack of process and the harm of an error against the
criminal defendant, error costs are higher for pretrial detention than for
preliminary injunctions. 110 Financial incentives that compensate for such error
costs could accordingly play an even more important role than their civil
counterpart.
Thus, both reasons that animate the injunction bond requirement for
preliminary injunctions—deterring unnecessary requests and compensating
defendants for harms they suffer from summary judicial process—apply with at
least as much force to pretrial detention as to preliminary injunctions.
2. Accounting for Differences Between the Systems
Many of the differences between the civil and criminal systems that bear
on whether to use financial incentives to limit requests for interim relief and
compensate defendants for harm incurred suggest that such an approach makes
more sense in criminal law than in civil procedure.
Pretrial detention involves the government encroaching on defendants’
liberty rather than a dispute between private parties, which suggests the need
for greater restraint on pretrial detention, perhaps by better allocating financial
incentives. 111 Although the injunction bond requirement appears to be
mandatory on its face, 112 courts sometimes excuse the requirement or set the
bond at a nominal amount when an injunction bond would overly dissuade
challenges to government action. For instance, in lawsuits challenging cutbacks
to public benefits or in environmental litigation, courts have excused or set the

109. Appellants’ Separate Appendix at 35, 78, 144, 183, 226, Arla Foods Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
893 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2252) (stating that the hearing began at 9:30 AM and ended at
4:52 PM; recesses occurred from 10:33–10:45 AM, 12:22–1:34 PM, 2:29–2:40 PM, and 3:51–3:57 PM).
110. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (weighing error costs for purposes of
procedural due process).
111. See Kuckes, supra note 19, at 14 (criticizing that “due process hearing rights that are routine
in the pretrial stages of civil cases can be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the
comparable or greater interests at stake”). It bears repeating here that although that calculus might
affect the due process floor, the argument here is about a sensible statutory or rule-based regime rather
than the contours of due process.
112. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c) (“The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary
restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay
the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”).
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bond quite low. 113 When the government seeks to restrain the liberty of criminal
defendants then, the same principle of facilitating checks on government
overreach counsels in favor of excusing defendants from paying a bond to avoid
that restraint. To be sure, this analogy is imperfect insofar as excusing the bond
requirement or setting nominal bond for a civil plaintiff challenging
government action is meant to preserve an opportunity for the plaintiff to be
heard in court; criminal defendants already have that opportunity regarding
pretrial detention, at least technically. But pretrial detention hearings do not
provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard; they often last for a minute or
two and defendants often lack counsel. 114 And detaining defendants chills their
future opportunities to participate in their own proceedings. 115 Thus, that the
government is the party seeking to impinge on defendants’ liberty in the
criminal system suggests at least that defendants should not be required to pay
bail to challenge governmental overreach.
Stepping back a bit, that criminal law uses financial incentives not to limit
the massive settlement leverage that pretrial detention affords prosecutors but
rather to increase that settlement leverage reflects a different normative
judgment between the two systems: prosecutors should retain massive
settlement leverage even as civil procedure strips that leverage away from
plaintiffs’ lawyers. 116 Caseload pressure is the classic explanation for what might
justify that disparity; preserving prosecutors’ leverage has practical appeal in a
system that, according to some assumptions, depends on prosecutors pleading
out most cases lest it be crushed under its own weight by case volume. 117
113. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2954; Morton, supra note 77, at 1869–70; see also, e.g.,
Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, where a party is seeking to
vindicate the public interest served by [the National Environmental Policy Act], a minimal bond
amount should be considered.”), abrogated on other grounds by Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t
v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016); Johnson v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 929, 952
(E.D. Mo. 2004) (excusing the bond requirement in a suit brought by homeless persons challenging
city police harassment because imposing the bond requirement would amount to denial of the claims).
114. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 1, 7; Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without
Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 386 (2011); Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 515–19;
Heaton et al., supra note 6, at 730, 773–74. For more on the importance of counsel at pretrial detention,
see also Wake Forest Law Review, Right to Counsel, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLt0g3LDC3s&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/3MFR-4688].
115. Defendants detained pretrial are more likely to plead guilty than those who are not detained.
See, e.g., Dobbie et al., supra note 86, at 203; Gouldin, supra note 82, at 860. Moreover, it is simply
much more difficult for an accused to coordinate with lawyers and mount a defense from jail than it
would be while on liberty.
116. See Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1094 (explaining that financial incentives help limit undue
settlement leverage in the civil system).
117. Prosecutors’ need to plead out so many cases affords defendants leverage to “crash the justice
system.” Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html
[https://perma.cc/7F5V-XVB2 (dark archive)]. See generally Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor
System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013) (applying the same idea to the misdemeanor system).
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But even the assumption that prosecutors must plead out most cases for
the system to function makes sense only if one assumes that the criminal law
must maintain its current caseload and that prosecutor budgets are static. 118 And
those underlying assumptions are not obvious. Prosecutors could charge only
the most important cases. 119
In a world of mass misdemeanors and the war on drugs I am skeptical
empirically of the claim that local prosecutors’ budgets are largely consumed by
politically mandatory cases. 120 But even if that description were accurate, simply
charging fewer cases would not offer a politically feasible solution. If indeed
prosecutor budgets are too tight for prosecutors to provide meaningful
procedure and maintain what they perceive to be the optimal level of criminal
law enforcement, they should need to ask the legislature for a larger
appropriation. Prosecutors represent an important lobbying force that typically
gets what it wants from legislatures, 121 in large part because their institutional
incentives align. 122 But cost concerns can sometimes impede prosecutors’ ability
118. Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 548–51. See generally Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse
Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183 (2014) (explaining that increased efficiency
allows prosecutors to pursue more cases).
119. Which sorts of cases are the most important will depend on the locality and the enforcement
preferences of the prosecutors’ constituents. See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution,
86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 80 (2011) [hereinafter Gold, Promoting Democracy](describing prosecutors as
agents of their local constituencies who should make policy-level decisions such as discerning
enforcement priorities as those constituents would wish within constitutional and other legal
parameters); see also Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutor Services of North Carolina, 41
CRIME & JUST. 211, 258–59 (2012) (demonstrating significant local variation across prosecutors’ offices
even in the face of efforts to centralize and standardize practices). But see Bruce A. Green & Rebecca
Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 819, 841–42 (2020) (arguing that to
the extent prosecutors as fiduciaries should account for public sentiment and preferences on a policy
level they should adhere to the preferences of their states as a whole—or the country as a whole, for
federal prosecutors—rather than their particular localities).
120. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2005) (arguing that prosecutors’
budgets are largely consumed by politically mandatory cases). See generally, e.g., ISSA KOHLERHAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (explaining misdemeanor prosecutions as a means of social
control); Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV.
971 (2020) (empirically detailing the scope of misdemeanor prosecutions in eight jurisdictions);
Roberts, supra note 117, at 1089–94 (explaining the rise of misdemeanor prosecutions).
121. Prosecutors’ lobbying groups are sufficiently powerful that there is no reason to worry that
they would go unheard. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728–29 &
n.25 (2005) (explaining the power of pro-enforcement groups in criminal law). But cf. Jeffrey Bellin,
The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 174–76 (2019) (arguing that scholarly literature
exaggerates prosecutors’ “power” because prosecutors secure victories largely through their alignment
of interests with legislatures rather than by overcoming resistance). See generally Rachel E. Barkow &
Mark Osler, Designed To Fail: The President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal
Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387 (2017) (arguing that prosecutorial interests in the
Department of Justice inhibited criminal justice reform in the Obama administration).
122. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534–35
(2001).
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to get what they want from legislatures—at least at the state level. 123 Indeed,
cost concerns have led some states to eliminate mandatory minimums,
reinstitute parole, or shorten some sentences to offset the cost of increasing
other sentences. 124 Promoting the difficult political conversation about whether
increased cost yields sufficient corresponding benefit can help restrain
prosecutorial overreach and improves democratic accountability. 125
Even if one were to conclude that securing guilty pleas in most cases
remains an important goal, maximizing prosecutor leverage is not the only way
to facilitate guilty pleas. 126 Criminal law could facilitate pleas in a way that more
closely resembles the civil system 127: it could improve information flow between
the parties, afford input of judges or other neutrals, create procedures that
impose transaction costs that both sides would prefer to avoid, and create
procedural moments that encourage both sides to think about the case
simultaneously. 128
Other differences between the two systems might seem, at a glance, to
undermine the effectiveness of financial incentives to limit pretrial detention,
but those differences prove less problematic upon further inspection.
Financial incentives might seem to apply more naturally and effectively in
the civil system, where disputes are often about finances, than in the criminal
system where disputes typically involve liberty. But that distinction does not
hold up as well as one might think. Although we tend to think of the civil system
123. Russell M. Gold, Prosecutors and Their Legislatures, Legislatures and Their Prosecutors, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTION (Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine &
Russell M. Gold eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 561–64, 568) [hereinafter Gold, Prosecutors
and Their Legislatures]; Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980–2000,
29 CRIME & JUST. 39, 67, 71–72 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing]; Ronald
F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV.
219, 258–59 (2004). Cost concerns are far less important at the federal level because criminal law
represents such a small slice of the overall budget, and the budget need not balance. See Gold, Prosecutors
and Their Legislatures, supra (manuscript at 563–64).
124. Nora V. Demleitner, Is There a Future for Leniency in the U.S. Criminal Justice System?, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1270–71 (2005) (discussing mandatory minimums and parole); Wright, Counting
the Cost of Sentencing, supra note 123, at 78–79 (describing North Carolina decreasing sentences to offset
other increases to address legislators’ concerns about cost).
125. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive Prosecutorial
Caseloads, a Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 148
(2011) (“[A] lack of resources may be the best available check against overzealous prosecution.”);
Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1734 (2015) (discussing the accountability
problem caused by police and prosecutors circumventing “normal budgeting politics”); Gold,
Prosecutors and Their Legislatures, supra note 123 (manuscript at 561–64, 568) (explaining that cost
concerns can cause legislatures not to provide prosecutors everything on their wish list).
126. See generally Gold et al., supra note 94 (proposing another way to maximize settlements in the
criminal system).
127. See generally id. (arguing that rather than maximizing prosecutorial leverage, the criminal
system can encourage settlements through procedures similar to those in the civil system).
128. Id. at 1631–52 (explaining the ways that civil procedure systems facilitate settlements and
proposing mapping those lessons onto the criminal system).
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as largely about providing monetary redress for harm, cases in which plaintiffs
seek a preliminary injunction are nearly always also cases where plaintiffs seek
permanent injunctive relief. 129 And if monetary relief were an adequate remedy,
an injunction would not be available. 130 Some such disputes are, at their core,
disputes where finances loom large, such as in some intellectual property
litigation. But plaintiffs also seek preliminary injunctive relief in civil rights
litigation where finances do not play a substantial role. 131 Thus, the injunction
bond requirement might more naturally align incentives in some civil cases than
in criminal cases, but the bond requirement applies nonetheless to discourage
interim relief even in civil cases in which money is not the primary focus of the
dispute. 132 Criminal cases are not altogether different from civil rights litigation
in this way then; discouraging strategic use of a potent settlement lever makes
sense even though such an incentive may not precisely align the incentives
because money is not at the core of the dispute.
It might be tempting to justify the two systems’ disparate use of financial
incentives with the idea that prosecutors are government lawyers and the civil
system often finds private parties on both sides of the “v.” After all, financial
incentives are one of the few available ways to steer the behavior of private
litigants. But it does not follow that we should entirely trust government lawyers
to make the right decisions without financial incentives and despite their own
self interests. Simply trusting prosecutors to make the right decisions on behalf
of the people is a common mechanism for prosecutor “accountability” in
America. 133 And although I tend to think that most prosecutors seek to do the
129. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.1. The exception would be preliminary
injunctions in damages cases where there is “a strong indication” that the defendant will become
insolvent before judgment. See Micro Signal Research, Inc. v. Otus, 417 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 2005);
see also 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2948.1.
130. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
131. See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207–08
(2020) (per curiam) (granting in part an application for stay in a case where the district court issued a
preliminary injunction extending the postmark date for absentee ballots in the Wisconsin primary
elections); Baqer v. St. Tammany Parish Gov’t, No. 20-980-WBV-JCW, 2020 WL 1820040, at *1
(E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction seeking more humane
conditions of pretrial confinement including conditions that provide for social distancing amidst a
pandemic).
132. The bond requirement may be forgiven or set at a low amount in some jurisdictions, however,
if the plaintiff is indigent. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 60, at 206–09 (detailing a divide across
jurisdictions regarding whether courts may excuse the injunction bond requirement); 11A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 61, § 2954 (explaining that so long as “the [district] court considers the question, it then
has discretion to decide not to require security” and endorsing courts’ decision to excuse a bond when
the movants are indigent, tying such discretion to the language of Rule 65 that affords flexibility to
judges in setting the bond amount).
133. See Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors, supra note 88, at 720 (“Accountability comes down to trusting
prosecutors’ commitment to public service and professional conscience in a regime where there are not
well-established standards to guide them.”); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 588 (2009) (“To some extent, we rely on the chief prosecutor’s professional
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right thing most of the time, they face structural impediments to achieving
those ends. 134 In the pretrial detention context, trusting prosecutors’ judgment
regarding when to deploy an extremely useful strategic tool that makes their
jobs vastly easier and imposes no monetary cost on them or their offices simply
asks too much. 135
One other potential difference between the civil and criminal contexts is
that relying on financial incentives that run against a government entity to
incentivize the behavior of salaried public employees is more complicated than
with individual parties where the incentive can apply directly. Achieving
optimality through financial incentives on public agencies may be impossible, 136
but there is nonetheless reason to think that financial incentives applied to the
organization can and do affect prosecutors to some extent. 137 Some European
systems impose such a financial incentive by requiring the government to
compensate defendants who are detained before trial but not convicted. 138 And
indeed, many domestic civil systems must operate on this premise that
government lawyers can be affected by financial incentives because they subject
government lawyers to the same financial incentives regarding preliminary

conscience: the prosecutor must remain individually committed to the ideal of responsible prosecution.
Our most beloved descriptions of the job speak to the importance of a prosecutor doing the job well
without any prompting from the outside.”).
134. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Institutions and Incentives, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 50 (describing prosecutors as “flying blind” and “fly[ing] solo”). But cf. Abbe
Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 396–400
(2001) (explaining why it is difficult to be both a good person and a good prosecutor, despite pure
intentions). See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Essay, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019) (questioning the extent to which prosecutors alone should be thought to
represent “the people”).
135. See, e.g., Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 81, at 410–11 (explaining the benefits and lack of
cost to prosecutors of pretrial detention).
136. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000).
137. See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 848–49 (2001) (arguing that constitutional tort
damages deter police officers even if not at a perfectly optimal level).
138. Doménech & Puchades, supra note 83, at 168–70; Masson v. Netherlands, 327 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 10–11, 20 (1995) (reviewing domestic law that allows civil court to grant compensation from
the state to defendants for damage suffered as a result of wrongful pretrial detention when a defendant
is not convicted). The threshold for warranting compensation varies from acquittal, e.g., Hugo Tiberg,
Compensation for Wrongful Imprisonment, 48 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 479, 480–81 (2005), to proof of
innocence, e.g., Strafrechtliches Entschädigungsgesetz [StEG], [Criminal Compensation Act] [BGB]
No. 270/1969, as amended, § 2 ¶ 1 letter B, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe
?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002138&FassungVom=2004-12-31 [https://perma.cc
/PU7V-W9HX] (Austria); 31 ch. 444 § LOV OM RETTERGANGSMÅTEN I STRAFFESAKER
(STRAFFEPROSESSLOVEN) [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT] (Norsk Lovtidend [LOV] 1981:05-22-25)
(Nor.); Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial arts. 293–294 (B.O.E. 1985, 12666)
(Spain).
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injunctions as they do private parties. 139 As Myriam Gilles explains,
constitutional tort awards cause complex dynamics within an organization
because they provide information to the public about that organization’s
behavior. 140 Organizations can also learn more about their own practices because
of litigation. 141 Similarly, imposing a cost on pretrial detention would draw lead
prosecutors’ attention to when their line prosecutors decide to seek pretrial
detention. Aurelie Ouss’s recent work empirically demonstrating a prosecutor’s
office responding to changes in cost structure provides further reason to think
that financial incentives at the organizational level would matter. 142 Moreover,
we tend to think in the asset forfeiture context that prosecutors respond to
financial gains that accrue to the office rather than the individual prosecutor. 143
Line prosecutors seem to care about forfeiture revenue as a matter of directives
from superiors or organizational reputation. 144
Lastly, even private entities face agency costs insofar as the party bearing
financial risk is an entity rather than an individual decisionmaker. There may
be reason to think that financial incentives within a private organization may
help align decisionmakers’ interests with the entity’s, but the mechanisms by

139. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Gas Co. v. City of Corpus Christi, 46 F.2d 962, 963 (5th Cir. 1931);
Provident Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Treasure Island, 796 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 2001); see also sources
cited supra note 57. The only difference between the government and a private litigant in those
jurisdictions is that the government need not post a bond in advance from which damages can be taken.
See, e.g., N.C. R. CIV. P. 65(c).
140. Gilles, supra note 137, at 854–55, 859–60.
141. Cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1056–
58 (2015) (explaining how litigation can provide information to organizational defendants).
142. Aurélie Ouss, Misaligned Incentives and the Scale of Incarceration in the United States
3 (Apr. 2020) (unpublished manuscript), http://aouss.github.io/ouss_incentives_justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VPl6-MTVN] (finding that criminal justice decisionmaking is cost sensitive insofar
as devolving costs of juvenile incarceration in California substantially reduced juvenile incarceration);
see also John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1593–95
(2017) (explaining that concern about a police department’s insurance costs deters police wrongdoing).
143. See Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 108–10 (describing prosecutors’ incentives
regarding forfeiture); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127
HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (2014) (“It is true that public enforcers do not profit from successful litigation
in the sense of taking home a percentage of awards, as private lawyers might. Nevertheless, the
institutional structures in which many public enforcers work provide ample incentives for salaried
government employees to prioritize and maximize financial recoveries.”).
144. Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 108–10; TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER,
COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL
ENGAGEMENT 143–44, 151 (2000) (discussing employees’ preferences about being affiliated with a
high-status organization and the way an organization’s status influences self-perception); see also Lemos
& Minzner, supra note 143, at 856–57 (discussing the relationship between agencies’ reputations and
financial recoveries). The Department of Justice “has regularly exhorted its attorneys to make ‘every
effort’ to increase ‘forfeiture production’ so as to avoid budget shortfalls.” Eric Blumenson & Eva
Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 63 (1998).
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which financial incentives that run to an organization affect the behavior of its
agents is complicated too. 145
Admittedly, that prosecutors should not be merely advocates in a purely
adversarial system but rather should be ministers of justice complicates the
propriety of financial incentives in ways not present in the civil system. 146 But
this concern about neither encouraging prosecutors to be too aggressive nor too
passive to adhere to their minister of justice role would be best addressed by
thinking carefully about how to design these incentives. 147
✦

✦

✦

Although the reasons that civil procedure relies on financial incentives to
limit interim relief make even more sense in criminal law, criminal law does not
rely on any such financial incentives. Rather, it uses financial incentives in the
opposite way—to encourage pretrial detention. That disparity contributes to a
more troubling disparity: criminal defendants are routinely deprived of their
liberty before trial—at least if they cannot pay to avoid that deprivation—but
civil defendants will not be made to suffer the indignities of having a property
interest restrained while the case is pending unless the plaintiff bears the risk
of financial loss. 148
This section has argued that such a disparity is unjustifiable. But
eliminating that disparity could take at least two forms: leveling up the
protections for defendants in the criminal system to better align with the civil
system or leveling down protections for defendants in the civil system. In broad
strokes, this Article embraces the former approach—increasing protections for
criminal defendants. 149 In so doing, this proposal is consistent with a series of
145. Cf. Levinson, supra note 136, at 352 (discussing the presence of agency costs in the public and
private sectors but focusing on civil service protections as a protracted source of public agency costs).
146. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).
147. It bears repeating here that articulating the idea structure for such incentives is beyond the
scope of this Article.
148. Within the criminal legal system, Black defendants are far more likely to be detained pretrial
than White defendants and are assigned higher bail amounts. BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 9. A recent
study using complex statistical tools and quasi-experimental design estimates that at least 68% of the
racially disparate outcomes in the New York data are attributable to discrimination rather than
differences in risk of nonappearance or further crime. David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Peter Hull,
Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions 20 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econs. at Univ. of Chi.,
Working Paper No. 2020-33, 2020). Another study focused on Philadelphia demonstrated that the
benefits of DA Larry Krasner’s no-cash-bail policy run disproportionately to White defendants. Aurelie
Ouss & Megan T. Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The Influence of Prosecutors 23 (George
Mason Legal Studies, Research Paper No. LS 19-08, 2020).
149. This Article does not consider whether, in at least some cases, the financial incentives overly
dissuade civil plaintiffs from seeking preliminary injunctions or even whether it might make sense to
exclude some narrow category of criminal cases from a system of financial incentives. See DOBBS &
ROBERTS, supra note 60, at 206–09 (describing variations between different systems regarding the
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recent articles that consider systems built to protect favored defendants as a
model for protecting all defendants. 150
Leveling up here is the better approach because dissuading relief before
judgment in civil and criminal cases makes sense. 151 Interim relief requires
courts to make snap judgments, and those judicial snap judgments become a
powerful tool for the winning side to facilitate “consensual” resolution of the
dispute. Those snap judgments may hurt the restrained party who had no
control over whether to pursue the interim relief in the first place. In short, the
reasons that civil procedure requires an injunction bond—reducing strategic use
of a procedural device to force settlement and compensating defendants for
harms caused by hasty judicial process—make eminently good sense in either
system. 152 Although such interim relief may sometimes be necessary,
discouraging it where unnecessary is largely to the good. As an economic matter,
requiring parties to internalize costs that they could otherwise externalize on
the other side—as the injunction bond does—is also good. Cost externalization
in criminal law under such a scenario would be far from perfect,153 but some
externalization is better than none.
Lastly, the criminal legal system detains far too many people before trial. 154
Consider some statistics from a recent empirical study of misdemeanors in
several U.S. jurisdictions. 155 For alleged misdemeanants where judges saw little
risk of release and thus set a bond of only $500, it is hard to see why more than

existence of judicial discretion not to require a bond); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 2954
(explaining that some courts “have found reversible error only when the district court failed to expressly
consider the question of requiring a bond,” meaning that so long as “the [district] court considers the
question, it then has discretion to decide not to require security,” and endorsing courts’ decisions to
excuse a bond when the movants are indigent). Nor does it argue that financial incentives should always
be used to dissuade interim relief. In some contexts, such as domestic violence restraining orders,
dissuading such requests through financial incentives would be a bad idea. There are plenty of barriers
that already confront victims of domestic violence from seeking legal process.
150. See Gold et al., supra note 94, at 1659–60 (suggesting leveling up criminal procedure to match
civil procedure with respect to means of facilitating settlements); Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1202–03 (2016) (suggesting leveling up protections for all suspects to match
those afforded to police suspects whose unions secured favorable treatment through collective
bargaining). See generally Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327 (2017) (considering
the judicial power to dismiss cases in furtherance of justice as a way to shed light on methods to increase
justice for all).
151. In the criminal context, Miller and Guggenheim note in passing that prosecutors’ incentive
structure encourages overuse of pretrial detention. Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 81, at 410–11.
152. See supra Section II.A; see also Dobbs, supra note 58, at 1093–94.
153. Many of the ways in which prosecutors need not internalize all relevant costs are discussed
below. Infra Section III.A.
154. See generally BAUGHMAN, supra note 2 (explaining that the costs of detaining as many people
pretrial as the United States does now vastly outstrips the benefits); Baughman, Costs of Pretrial
Detention, supra note 7, at 3–4 (same).
155. See generally Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 120, at 1009–10 (providing an empirical analysis
of how misdemeanors are processed across eight diverse jurisdictions).
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40% of those defendants should remain incarcerated as they did. 156 That pretrial
detention is self-defeating—it increases failures to appear and the likelihood of
a defendant committing a crime while on release—and that it is criminogenic
more broadly make this outcome even worse than it may seem at first glance. 157
Indeed, narrowing the number of cases in which judges have to decide whether
a defendant should be detained pretrial is a core piece of the newly emerging
reform models in many jurisdictions. 158 Typically, that narrowing comes from
issuing summons in lieu of custodial arrest. 159 But alleviating pressure on the
bail system by deploying financial incentives to discourage prosecutors from
requesting detention (whether through setting unaffordable bail or denying it
entirely) can help achieve the same objective.
This section has treated the two goals of the injunction bond—dissuading
requests for interim relief and compensating those harmed by interim relief—
as necessarily running together because they do in the preliminary injunction
system. The plaintiff bears financial risk and the money that the plaintiff puts
up goes to compensate defendants. Although this Article does not consider what
mechanism would best implement financial incentives in pretrial detention, 160
it is nonetheless worth noting at this point that not every structure meant to
deter requests for interim relief need necessarily equate deterrence and
compensation. 161 And if put to the choice broadly between deterrence and
compensation, deterrence is the more important objective. Compensating
pretrial detainees for harms such as lost housing or custody of a child will
necessarily be imperfect remedies; the increased chance of avoiding that harm
in the first place is better for defendants than imperfect compensation. 162
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., BAUGHMAN, supra note 2, at 161 (“Even short periods of pretrial detention increase
the risk of recidivism.”); id. at 82 (recounting findings that “[d]efendants held for 2–3 days were 22
percent more likely to fail to appear in court than similarly situated defendants who were held for less
than 24 hours” and that “[d]efendants held for 15–30 days” failed to appear 41% of the time).
158. Wake Forest Law Review, Risk Assessment, YOUTUBE (Apr. 17, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjMuu3_iRCA&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/A8KY-6NVL]; see
also RAHMAN, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that the New York bail reform bill included mandatory
issuance of summons in lieu of arrest for many offenses).
159. See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 56, at 11.
160. Damages or a limited fund would be two plausible ways to implement financial incentives in
the prosecutor context. Discussing the best mechanism for such incentives is beyond the scope of this
Article, however.
161. In some class actions, for instance, defendants may pay settlement money that does not go
directly to victims but rather funds a charitable endeavor or some very rough proxy of the victims’
interests through the cy pres mechanism. See generally, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in
Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997 (2016) (arguing that compensating victims in class actions
is important to facilitating deterrence).
162. Cf. generally David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option
for Mass Tort Cases Response, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) (arguing that achieving broader deterrence
by eliminating opt outs in mass tort class actions improves social welfare compared to letting some
defendants with high-value claims opt out and receive more compensation).
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III. DEEPENING EXISTING PATHOLOGIES
The existing disparity between the civil and criminal systems’ uses of
financial incentives surrounding interim relief advances two existing bodies of
scholarship that recognize different pathologies in American criminal law. 163
Section III.A contends that the financial incentive disparity represents one
more manifestation of criminal law not forcing prosecutors’ offices to bear the
full costs of their decisions—the correctional free lunch problem. It unites
several different strands of criminal law scholarship under the correctional free
lunch umbrella and then situates the pretrial financial incentive disparity as one
more instance of a correctional free lunch. Section III.B then shows that the
financial incentive disparity tracks predictable disparities in race, wealth, and
power between civil and criminal defendants. 164
A.

Prosecutors’ Free Lunches

That the government does not bear the financial risk of its pretrial
detention decisionmaking but shifts the financial burden instead onto criminal
defendants is another iteration of a familiar story: criminal law is too cheap.
Prosecutors’ offices do not bear the full costs of prosecutors’ decisions, and
criminal law thereby structurally encourages over-prosecution. 165 Criminal law
enforcement of course imposes substantial costs on defendants and their lives,
many of which are not easily monetized nor would they be easy to force
prosecutors to internalize. But even for purely monetary costs, prosecutors’
offices frequently do not bear the full financial costs of their decisions; indeed,
in some instances, the government as a whole does not even bear those costs.
Scholars refer to this pathology of making prosecution too cheap by not
requiring prosecutors’ offices to bear the full costs of their decisions as a
correctional free lunch. 166 This section begins by bringing scholarship regarding
criminal fines and fees as well as asset forfeiture within the correctional free
163. This Article does not seek to explain historically why the two systems take different
approaches.
164. See generally Ion Meyn, The Creation of Separate and Unequal Courtrooms (July 1, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that the race
disparity between the parties in the civil and criminal systems accounts for procedural differences).
165. Cf. generally Brown, supra note 118 (arguing that increased efficiency in criminal law can be
perverse insofar as it enables more prosecutions); Gold, Promoting Democracy, supra note 119, at 79–80
(arguing that prosecutions should be brought so long as their marginal social benefit exceeds or equals
their marginal social cost, subject to other ethical constraints); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1059, 1094–98 (2015) (describing decriminalization of
misdemeanors as “the next generation of the ‘net-widening’ phenomenon”). Criminal law enforcement
also includes policing, but the focus of this Article is on prosecutors and thus this section focuses on
the prosecutors’ decisionmaking and not prior policing expenditures.
166. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140
(1991) (coining the term); see also Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice,
116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 194–204 (2017) (discussing structural misalignment problems in criminal law).
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lunch umbrella. It then contributes one more instance of a correctional free
lunch—the financial incentive structure for pretrial detention.
Most famously, the correctional free lunch problem addresses the notion
that counties pay prosecutors but states pay for prisons, so prosecutors can shift
the incarceration costs of their decisions onto another geographic entity. 167
When county prosecutors secure convictions and sentences in excess of a year,
defendants typically serve those sentences in state prisons rather than local jails;
county prosecutors thus shift the cost of housing those inmates to a different
geographic entity—the state.
When we view each county government not as a monolith but look instead
at individual office budgets, the picture gets more complicated—and even
worse—for incentive alignment. Adam Gershowitz rightly identifies separate
prosecutor and jail budgets as another correctional free lunch problem even
within a county. 168 Prosecutors may care about their conviction statistics and
their own budgets but not about the cost to the jail budget for housing those
inmates pretrial (or post-conviction for short sentences served in county jail). 169
These sorts of “horizontal misalignments” appear in several aspects of criminal
law that relatedly yield more free lunches. 170 Police officers, to provide another
example, might care only about arrest statistics and not prosecutions. 171
Still other bodies of criminal law scholarship address what we can also
think of as correctional free lunch problems but have not yet been categorized
as such. The government in many jurisdictions shifts some of the costs of
criminal law enforcement to defendants through prevalent use of fines and fees.
Criminal defendants are assessed fees for “law enforcement investigations,
prosecutors’ preparation for trial, issuance of arrest warrants, and impaneling of
a jury.” 172 Defendants are also charged for pretrial detention and for post-

167. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 166, at 140.
168. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677 (2016) (arguing that local prosecutors should bear
responsibility for their local jails to eliminate this correctional free lunch).
169. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 166, at 198; see also Gershowitz, supra note 168, at 681
(proposing that prosecutors’ offices control jails to prevent this second dimension of a correctional free
lunch). On a federal level, the Bureau of Prisons is housed within the same agency as the prosecutors—
the Department of Justice—albeit in such a large agency that one can hardly be expected to be
responsive to the other. Cf. generally Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and
the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 336–40 (2013) (arguing that corrections and clemency
functions should not be housed within a prosecution-driven agency like the Department of Justice).
170. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 166, at 198–200.
171. Id. at 198.
172. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 286 (2014)
[hereinafter Colgan, Reviving] (footnotes omitted). Alabama fills the coffers of its “Fair Trial Tax
Fund” by charging fees to criminal defendants, to the tune of nearly $2.5 million. ALA. APPLESEED
CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, UNDER PRESSURE: HOW FINES AND FEES HURT PEOPLE, UNDERMINE
PUBLIC SAFETY, AND DRIVE ALABAMA’S RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE 17–19 (2018), http://
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conviction incarceration. 173 Similarly puzzling is the filing fee, imposed not
against the party that filed the case as it would be in the civil system 174 but
against the defendant who would much prefer to both save the money and not
be charged with a crime. 175 Moreover, “courts have assigned counsel to millions
of American defendants too poor to pay for an attorney, and later required those
defendants to pay for their counsels’ services.” 176 In short, the accused are
charged for the privilege of being dragged through the criminal legal process
and being housed in hellish conditions. If they receive a sentence of probation
or are released on parole, defendants get to pay for those privileges too. 177
Convicted defendants may face fines and perhaps surcharges on top of those
fines. 178 Compounding those fines and fees, defendants are charged interest, late
fees, and collection costs, all of which count the time the defendant spends
incarcerated where it is impossible to earn nearly enough money to afford the
fees. 179
In imposing all of these fines and fees, the government offloads costs of
its own decisions onto defendants. 180 From an economic efficiency standpoint,
www.alabamaappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/AA1240-FinesandFees-10-10-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7J82-KVQX].
173. Colgan, Reviving, supra note 172, at 287; Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, in 4
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 205, 206 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu
/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_4.pdf [https://perma.cc
/K59Y-FGM8]; Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1175, 1192.
174. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2018) (“The clerk of each district court shall require the parties
instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or
otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $350 . . . .”).
175. See Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1935 (2014) [hereinafter
Colgan, Paying for Gideon].
176. Id. at 1929. Indeed, every jurisdiction in the country has recoupment authority to require
defendants to pay fees for their own lawyers even though those lawyers were appointed because of the
defendants’ poverty. Id. at 1931 n.4. Of the twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia that have
indigent defense systems, twenty-three require defendants to pay for their attorneys. SUZANNE M.
STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE-ADMINISTERED
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013, at 1, 7 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saids13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48TU-S2K3].
The constitutionality of assessing public defender fees against the indigent is questionable.
See, e.g., Kate Levine, Note, If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the Constitutionality of Massachusetts’s
Reimbursement Statute, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 191, 193 n.12 (2007) (collecting sources
questioning the constitutionality of these fees). But see Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53–54 (1974)
(declaring the assessment of public defender fees constitutional). For the surprising political story of
application fees for defense counsel, see Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy
of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2055–72 (2006).
177. Colgan, Reviving, supra note 172, at 287.
178. Id. at 285.
179. Id. at 288.
180. Defendants may also often be assessed restitution, but because that assessment compensates
victims for their losses, id. at 285; see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3663A (2018); ALA. CODE §§ 1518-66 to -68 (Westlaw through Act 2020-88); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.753(3) (Westlaw
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perhaps most troubling of all is that sometimes fee proceeds go to prosecutors’
offices,181 which reduces the marginal cost of those prosecutions. Not only, then,
do prosecutors’ offices have their marginal cost of prosecution reduced by
avoiding paying for parts of the criminal process, but sometimes that marginal
cost is doubly reduced by actually obtaining revenue from those parts of the
process. Other portions of those fines may go to defray other government
expenses related to criminal law administration such as Alabama’s Fair Trial
Tax Fund. 182
Not only do fees shift costs from prosecutors to defendants, they also
create deadweight loss. Charging fees to defendants yields court debt that
increases crime and thereby imposes broader social costs. In a recent study in
Alabama, for instance, more than 38% of respondents reported committing at
least one crime to pay their court debt; 183 for defendants who incurred debt from
mere traffic violations, nearly 20% admitted to committing a more serious crime
to service their debt. 184 More than 13% of respondents in the Alabama study
skipped child support payments to pay off their criminal “justice” debt. 185
Lastly, because many defendants are poor and cannot afford to pay this debt,
they may face further incarceration over their inability to pay, which of course
also costs government money and results in further deadweight losses. 186
Civil asset forfeiture too yields a free lunch problem because it allows
prosecutors’ offices to reduce the marginal costs of prosecution. 187 Federal law
allows the government to broadly pursue forfeiture of assets bearing some
relationship to an alleged crime 188 and allows the Department of Justice to retain

through Chapter 218 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.), it does not pose the same interest-alignment concerns as
do the other fees and fines.
181. See STATE OF ALA. UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYS., FEE DISTRIBUTION CHART [hereinafter
STATE OF ALA.], http://www.alacourt.gov/docs/FEE%20DISTRIBUTION%20CHART.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T8DV-5LAQ] (providing a breakdown of where proceeds from various fees are
distributed, including the “DA Fund”); see also ALA. CODE § 12-17-197(c) (Westlaw through Act 202088) (preserving a separate “district attorney’s fund for the payment of any and all expenses to be
incurred by [the district attorney] for law enforcement and in the discharge of the duties of his office,
as he sees fit”).
182. ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 17–19 (explaining the “Fair
Trial Tax Fund” and reporting that in 2017 that fund obtained nearly $2.5 million in fine proceeds);
STATE OF ALA., supra note 181 (stating what portion of per-defendant fees goes to the Fair Trial Tax
Fund).
183. ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 31. Because this statistic relies
on self-reporting, there is reason to think it is undercounting.
184. Id. at 32.
185. Id. at 31.
186. Colgan, Reviving, supra note 172, at 290–91; Colgan, Paying for Gideon, supra note 175, at
1934–35.
187. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 144, at 56; Logan & Wright, supra note 173, at 1195.
188. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2018). For a more detailed explanation of forfeiture law and the
surrounding incentives, see, for example, Gold, “Clientless” Lawyers, supra note 42, at 108–10.
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forfeiture proceeds. 189 Some state laws operate similarly. 190 States can
participate in the “equitable sharing” program whereby the federal government
uses its permissive regime to affect forfeiture on the State’s behalf in exchange
for a portion of the proceeds. 191 Federal proceeds from forfeitures totaled nearly
$4.5 billion in 2014, 192 and that amount does not account for state-level
forfeitures. That forfeiture proceeds go to prosecutors’ offices—like some
fines—is particularly troubling for economic efficiency purposes because it
reduces the marginal cost of those prosecutions to prosecutors. So too does it
circumvent an important legislative and democratic check on prosecutors—
appropriations and budget discipline. 193
Civil asset forfeiture and criminal fines and fees would seem to raise
substantial due process concerns, but the Supreme Court has been utterly
feckless when it comes to enforcing due process for criminal defendants outside
the context of a trial. 194 That statement remains true even as the Court has
recognized that “plea bargaining . . . is the criminal justice system” 195 and has
clarified that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the
bargaining context. 196 In the civil context, due process requires a predeprivation hearing before a court can restrict the use of an asset
prejudgment. 197 Indeed, that remains true even when the property to be

189. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 144, at 50.
190. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV.
463, 477 & n.66 (2017) (collecting citations to state and federal laws that are on point with this issue).
191. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 144, at 50–51, 54.
192. DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE
OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 10–11 (2d ed. 2015); see also Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH.
POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/
[https://perma.cc/HCD8-44AE (dark archive)] (finding that the federal Equitable Sharing Program
involved seizures valued at over $2.5 billion dollars between September 2001 and September 2014).
193. See Bowers, supra note 125, at 148 (“[A] lack of resources may be the best available check
against overzealous prosecution.”); Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture
Laws, Policing Incentives, and Local Budgets, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2135 (2007) (explaining that state
and local legislatures account for forfeiture proceeds in budgeting); Gold, Prosecutors and Their
Legislatures, supra note 123 (manuscript at 561–64, 568) (explaining that cost sometimes prevents
prosecutors from getting what they want from legislatures). That Ferguson, Missouri, for instance,
could raise more than $2.4 million through fines and fees in 2013—its second largest source of income—
without any legislative involvement, see Developments in the Law—Policing, supra note 125, at 1724, works
an end run on legislative accountability.
194. See generally Kuckes, supra note 19 (arguing compellingly that the Supreme Court has provided
vastly less protection for the pretrial procedural due process rights of criminal defendants than for civil
defendants); see also id. at 14 (“[D]ue process hearing rights that are routine in the pretrial stages of
civil cases can be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the comparable or greater
interests at stake.”).
195. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012).
196. Id. at 140–44; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–66 (2010).
197. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11–12, 24 (1991).
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restrained—such as a stove—forms the subject of the dispute. 198 Refrigerators
receive similar protection. 199 Justice Stewart criticized the Court for
establishing that “the Constitution extends less procedural protection to an
imprisoned human being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a
commercial bank account, the custody of a refrigerator, the temporary
suspension of a public school student, or the suspension of a driver’s license.” 200
Although a civil creditor cannot constitutionally ask a court to limit a civil
defendant’s ability to control the property interest in his own home or stove
without affording a pre-deprivation hearing, 201 the government can restrain the
body of a criminal defendant with no such pre-deprivation hearing. 202 Rather,
the Supreme Court has “rejected the argument that procedural protections
required in [civil] due process cases should be afforded to a criminal suspect
arrested without a warrant.” 203
That prosecutors need not bear the full costs of their decisionmaking
encourages them to exceed optimal criminal enforcement. Financial incentives
regarding pretrial detention are one more way in which the government need
not bear the full costs of its decisionmaking. These financial incentives too are
a form of free lunch, and they piggyback on the correctional free lunch between
prosecutors and local jails. As Gershowitz rightly explains, prosecutors’ budgets
do not bear the strain of detaining defendants in local jails. 204 The jail budget
does that. Prosecutors can (often successfully) ask the court to spend the jail’s
money in detaining defendants pretrial.
A financial incentive akin to preliminary injunctions where prosecutors
bear financial risk to seek interim relief could eliminate that level of correctional
free lunch problem. But criminal law takes the opposite tack. Many defendants
are incarcerated pretrial unless they can afford their freedom, thereby shifting
the financial burden onto defendants and away from the prosecutor with
significant power to control these expenditures. Imposing the financial
incentive to avoid interim relief on the defendant increases prosecutors’
incentives to exploit the fact that someone else bears the cost of jailing
defendants pretrial—the county-level correctional free lunch.

198. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (holding unconstitutional prejudgment seizure
of a stove and phonograph in a suit alleging default on debt as to those items).
199. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616–20 (1974) (upholding a Louisiana statute as
consistent with due process because it required proof presented to a judge of the existence of a lien on
the property and prompt judicial process to dissolve the attachment).
200. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
201. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11–12, 24 (home); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96 (stove).
202. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123 (majority opinion).
203. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 697–98 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Kuckes, supra note
19, at 7 n.33.
204. Gershowitz, supra note 168, at 680.
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Race, Wealth, and Power

Race, wealth, and power disparities between the two systems track the
disparate financial incentives. Put most simply, most criminal defendants are
disproportionately poor, politically powerless people of color. 205 Most civil
defendants are corporations or entities whose interests hold some political clout
and whose executives will most often be primarily White. 206 Critical race theory
provides a useful lens through which to see these embedded power and race
dynamics as structural causes for the disparity in protections against relief
before judgment.
A quick overview of some aspects of critical race theory is necessary to
help ground this discussion. 207 “Critical race theorists assert that both the
procedure and the substances of American law, including American
antidiscrimination law, are structured to maintain white privilege” 208 and that
such racism is ordinary rather than aberrational. 209 They argue that law
disproportionately harms people of color and maintains power hierarchies even
when legal regimes appear facially race-neutral. 210
Now let us consider the profile of a typical defendant in each of the two
systems. Poor people of color are vastly disproportionately represented as
205. Infra notes 208–24 and accompanying text.
206. Infra notes 225–28 and accompanying text.
207. I recognize that I am not a person of color and that interposing my own voice risks distorting
the perspective of critical race theorists. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson from the Very Bottom of the
Well: Critical Race Theory and the Supreme Court’s Peremptory Challenge Jurisprudence, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 71, 72–73 (2014) (explaining her hesitance to embrace the mantle of Critical Race Theory
because she is not a person of color and agreeing with Critical Race Theorists that “perspective
matters”); see also, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Critical Race Theory and Criminal Justice, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2014) (explaining the importance of “legal storytelling” from outsider perspectives in
Critical Race Theory).
For much more extensive explanations of critical race theory, see generally, for example,
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed.
2012) [hereinafter DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY]; CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013); Capers, supra; Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Essay, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461
(1993).
208. Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris, Battles Waged, Won, and Lost:
Critical Race at the Turn of the Millennium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL
RACE THEORY 1, 1 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
209. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 207, at 7.
210. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 207, at 2 (explaining that a central tenet of critical race theory is
that “color-blind laws often serve to marginalize and obscure social, political, and economic
inequality”); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory and Criminal Justice, 31
HUMAN. & SOC’Y 133, 136 (2007) (“Probably one tenet that most [critical race theorists] would
endorse is that racism is ordinary, not exceptional—the usual way that society does business—and thus
represents the common, everyday experience of most people of color in this country.”); Derrick Bell,
Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 369 (1992) (pointing to the Supreme Court’s affirmative action
decision in Bakke “as an example of how formalists may use abstract concepts, such as equality, to mask
policy choices and value judgments”).
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targets of American criminal law enforcement. 211 A 2014 study found that many
police departments arrested Black people at a rate ten times higher than people
who are not Black. 212 To take a particular example, more than half of the people
arrested in Dearborn, Michigan in 2011 and 2012 were Black even though the
city’s residents were overwhelmingly White. 213 FBI statistics from 2017 reveal
that more than 27% of all arrestees nationally were Black or African American. 214
In cities, the numbers are even more disparate with Black or African American
defendants comprising more than 29% of arrestees. 215 These percentages are
more than double the percentage of Black or African American people in the
U.S. population as a whole. 216
Prison data reveals a starker disparity. In 2016, only 30% of prison inmates
identified as White. 217 That percentage remained between 30% and 31% over
the previous five years. 218 As of 2014, “[i]n twelve states, more than half of the
prison population is black.” 219 In Maryland, 72% of the prison population is
African American. 220

211. See James Forman Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
791, 793 (2011) (“Blacks are about eight times as likely to go to prison as whites.”); Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1365 (2012) (“[T]he petty offense process is permitted to
distribute criminal liability based on race and social vulnerability rather than individual fault.”); id. at
1368 (“Misdemeanors thus represent the concrete mechanism by which the system is able to generate
‘criminals’ based on race, class, and social vulnerability, unconstrained by standard evidentiary
requirements.”); Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 120, at 1017 (“[T]he per-capita misdemeanor casefiling rate is higher for black people than for white people for every offense type, in every jurisdiction.
For most offenses, the per-capita case-filing rate for blacks is two to four times that of whites.”).
212. Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: “Staggering Disparity”, USA TODAY
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates
/19043207/ [https://perma.cc/C7HM-P9YW].
213. Id.
214. Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Arrests, Table 43A, FBI: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTING (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topicpages/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/MH5K-D22U]. For these purposes I have used the labels from
the Department of Justice’s data table.
215. Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Arrests, Table 49A, FBI: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTING (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables
/table-49 [https://perma.cc/ZM4D-N6CQ].
216. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS: UNITED STATES, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/fact/table/US/POP010210 [https://perma.cc/CA5Y-SVFZ] (estimating that Black people
or African Americans comprised 13.4% of the U.S. population as of July 1, 2018).
217. See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017, at 6 tbl.3 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Q69-TK6V].
218. Id. That number ticks up only as high as 30.8% over the previous five years. See id.
219. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KL8J-MNNY].
220. Id.
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But race does not tell the whole story; intersectionality of race and class is
important. “[P]rison has become the province of the poor and uneducated, even
within the black community.” 221
Even within criminal law that has already disproportionately burdened
poor people of color in its earliest stages through policing, we can see the
importance of race where people of color are detained before trial more
frequently and for longer than are White defendants. 222 Poor defendants of
color also receive less process and enjoy less of what might seem like a
presumption of innocence. 223 Most defendants’ bail hearings last for a matter of
minutes. 224 By contrast, however, some wealthy (often White) defendants
receive much more process. For instance, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates’s
bail hearing lasted for thirty-eight minutes, and the government consented to
pretrial liberty rather than detention. 225 When the government later accused
Manafort of tampering with witnesses while out on bail, he had eleven days of
freedom and written briefing by his lawyers while the government’s motion to
revoke bond was pending. 226 The court then held a one-hour hearing on the
government’s motion. 227 Such robust process that wealthy criminal defendants
enjoy represents a marked exception in a system that routinely prosecutes
underprivileged and under-resourced defendants of color.
By contrast, most civil defendants are powerful entities. And most
corporate executives in America are White. 228 Powerful entities know in
221. Forman Jr., supra note 211, at 794; see also Valdes et al., supra note 208, at 2 (underscoring the
importance of intersectionality).
222. Michael R. Menefee, The Role of Bail and Pretrial Detention in the Reproduction of Racial
Inequalities, 12 SOC. COMPASS, Mar. 30, 2018, at 1, 4 (collecting sources); see also, e.g., John
Wooldredge, Distinguishing Race Effects on Pre-Trial Release and Sentencing Decisions, 29 JUST. Q. 41, 41
(2012); ACLU FLA. GREATER MIAMI, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES
IN MIAMI-DADE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (finding that Black defendants “are more likely than White
defendants to suffer[] longer periods of pretrial detention [and] greater rates of pretrial detention”).
223. See Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4, at 515–23.
224. See, e.g., Change Difficult, supra note 103; Length of a Bail Hearing, supra note 103.
225. See Court Docket at 8, United States v. Manafort, 314 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D.D.C. Oct. 30,
2018) (No. 1:17-CR-00201).
226. Peter Maass, Paul Manafort Has Inadvertently Helped America by Showing the Absurdities of Its
Bail System, INTERCEPT (June 9, 2018, 9:04 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/06/09/paul-manafortbail-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/ZT48-X49E] (“That’s an 11-day window, from June 4 until June 15,
during which Manafort remains free — while other people in that situation would probably be put
behind bars right away.”); Tierney Sneed, Judge Sends Manafort to Jail After Revoking His Bail, TPM
(June 15, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/judge-sends-manafort-to-jailafter-revoking-his-bail [https://perma.cc/3XPC-3TRC].
227. Sneed, supra note 226.
228. See, e.g., CTR. FOR TALENT INNOVATION, BEING BLACK IN CORPORATE AMERICA 2
(2019), https://www.talentinnovation.org/_private/assets/BeingBlack-KeyFindings-CTI.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7VE8-D7UM] (reporting that 0.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs are Black and 3.2% of
Executive/senior-level officials and managers are Black); Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate
Policy on Women and People of Color, 7 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 213, 220 & n.36 (2003) (noting that
only a “tiny percentage of corporate directors and senior executives are women or people of color” and
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advance that they are much more likely to be defendants than plaintiffs in the
civil justice system. 229 That advanced knowledge permits them to direct their
considerable resources toward a defendant-friendly agenda, both through
rulemaking and amicus briefing. 230 Repeat players, like corporate defendants,
can also strategically settle and appeal individual cases to benefit from longerterm gains through favorable rules. 231 One-shot plaintiffs, however, have no
such available strategy or even interest in a rule-based victory. 232
The comparative lens between the civil and criminal systems helps reveal
a mechanism of racism and classism built into the fabric of American criminal
law and its lack of protection for the rights of the accused. While civil procedure
ensures that defendants’ property interests are not frequently restrained before
judgment, criminal law’s incentive structure encourages deprivation of
defendants’ pretrial liberty. These disparities in race, wealth, and political
power between the two systems suggest significant structural impediments to
eliminating the financial incentive disparity.
Civil asset forfeiture also provides a useful comparative lens because it
eliminates the property/liberty distinction and focuses on property interests
across both systems. Preliminary injunctions are difficult for plaintiffs to
obtain—in part because they face a financial incentive to dissuade them from
seeking such relief. 233 By contrast, criminal defendants can be deprived of their
property rights without much meaningful protection at all via civil forfeiture. 234

that “only 0.6% of senior-level managers in major companies are African-American”); Frank Dobbin
& Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/2016/07/whydiversity-programs-fail [https://perma.cc/HN8Z-FYG9 (dark archive)] (recounting that among all
U.S. companies with 100 or more employees, Black men made up only 3.3% of management as of 2014).
229. See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1797 (2014) (“[When] ‘[p]laintiff’ and ‘defendant’
became identity-based categories that meant that not all would benefit or suffer equally from the impact
of civil rules.”); see also Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 663
(2010) (discussing the typical allocation of sophistication between the parties in various types of civil
cases). I have not been able to find any hard statistics about what portion of defendants in civil litigation
are large corporations or other entities.
230. See Marc Galanter, Essay, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103 (1974).
231. Id. at 100–02; see also id. at 103–04 (explaining that because “haves” tend to be repeat players
while “have nots” tend to be one-shotters, “a legal system formally neutral as between ‘haves’ and ‘havenots’ may perpetuate and augment the advantages of the former”).
232. Id. at 100–03.
233. For more detail on the preliminary injunction standard and the comparison to criminal
pretrial detention, see generally Gold, Jail as Injunction, supra note 4.
234. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari)
(describing the civil forfeiture system as one “where police can seize property with limited judicial
oversight and retain it for their own use” that “has led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses”); Stefan
B. Herpel, Toward a Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil Forfeiture in America, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1910, 1911
(1998) (reviewing LEONARD LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY (1996))
(“[C]ivil in rem forfeiture proceedings have been used—and increasingly are being used—as an

98 N.C. L. REV. 1255 (2020)

1294

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

Civil forfeiture requires neither a conviction nor even a criminal charge235 and
lacks the procedural protections such as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or jury trial right. 236 Even Justice Thomas has expressed great concern
that civil forfeiture proceedings “frequently target the poor and other groups
least able to defend their interests.”237
So too may we owe the persistence of widely disparate standards for
pretrial procedural due process between the civil and criminal systems to the
disparity in race, wealth, and power between defendants in the two systems. 238
CONCLUSION
Financial incentives discourage plaintiffs from seeking preliminary
injunctions. That tempering incentive is important because interim relief is an
extraordinary remedy that affords one party substantial settlement leverage. So
too do financial incentives compensate defendants for harms incurred because
of summary judicial process in the preliminary injunction decision. Those same
reasons—settlement leverage and compensating for summary process—apply
with at least as much force to criminal pretrial detention. Indeed, discouraging
the government from using one form of liberty deprivation—pretrial
detention—as a means of facilitating a waiver of constitutional rights and
further liberty deprivation—a guilty plea and ensuing sentence—makes even
more sense in criminal law than do financial incentives for preliminary
injunctions. But the criminal system does not use financial incentives to limit
the number of accused defendants who lose their liberty before judgment. It
does the opposite. Criminal law encourages interim relief—detaining criminal
defendants unless they can pay to secure their freedom. This disparity is
troubling and unjustified.
Recognizing this disparity contributes to the literature regarding wellrecognized pathologies in criminal law: correctional free lunches and racism and
classism. Scholars have articulated a few manifestations of the correctional free
lunch problem whereby prosecutors do not bear the full costs of their decisions.
After situating several other bodies of criminal law scholarship within the
correctional free lunch umbrella, this Article explains how financial incentives
surrounding pretrial detention constitute one more version of a correctional free
lunch that evades the constraining force of budget discipline. The comparative
lens helps bring to light this troubling disparity between a system that
expedient to circumvent the usual protections accorded to defendants in criminal proceedings, and to
augment federal, state, and local treasuries.”).
235. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Timbs
v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
236. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847–48.
237. Id. at 848.
238. See generally Kuckes, supra note 19 (detailing that disparity in pretrial due process).
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structurally protects defendants against its overuse before judgment (civil) and
one that structurally facilitates overuse (criminal). That the typical criminal
defendant is a poor person of color without political power and the typical civil
defendant is a wealthy corporation suggests that the financial incentive
disparity may persist in part because of racism, classism, and power disparities.
The aim of this Article is conceptual; it builds out a novel comparison as
a critique of disparities between the criminal and civil systems. And it argues
that the disparity would be best resolved by importing some form of financial
incentives to the pretrial detention context. It does not, however, seek to specify
the mechanism by which pretrial detention should embrace financial incentives.
A pure analog to the injunction bond seems quite unlikely to be the right
answer. Rather, building such a structure for the criminal legal system will
require careful attention to differences between the two systems, including the
massive resource and leverage disparities discussed above. Such a task will have
to be left for another day.
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